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INTRODUGTION
No institution has shaped the economic development of the world
more than the bank.' In its most unadorned form, a bank is a "busi-
ness establishment authorized to perform financial transactions, such
as receiving or lending money."2 Every bank has assets equal to the
sum of its liabilities and equity-capital.3 Bank capital, or bank equity,
can thus be described as the bank's residual interest in its assets.
Every bank bears the risk that its assets are actually worth less than the
stated value on its balance sheet. If asset market values decline, fewer
asset dollars will be available to settle the constant liabilities of the
bank, resulting in a corresponding decrease in capital. If a bank's
capital decreases too much, the bank may be unable to satisfy its obli-
gations and therefore become insolvent. Consequently, governments
have sought to reduce bank insolvency through capital adequacy regu-
lation. For bankers, lawyers, and even professors, these combined
regulations constitute an overwhelming brain-teaser of financial law.4
Nonetheless, bankers, economists, lawyers, and legal scholars must
understand these regulations because the "capital adequacy regime is
the single most important set of rules and proposals in both interna-
tional and domestic banking law.'C This Comment seeks to aid those
trying to understand this "multibillion-dollar global regulatory scheme
See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILIAM D. NoRDHAus, EcONOMIcs 488 (15th ed.
1995) (stating that "from a macroeconomic vantage point the most important instru-
ment is bank money... primarily provided today by commercial banks").
2 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DIcnONARY 67 (3d ed. 1994).
3 SeeROBERT F. MEIGS & WALTER B. MEIGS, ACCOUNTING: THEBASIS FOR BUSrNESS
DECISIONs 20 (9th ed. 1993) (defining the central "accounting equation" as "Assets =
Liabilities + Owner's Equity").
' See Raj Bhala, Equilibrium Theoy, the FICAS Model, and International Banking Law,
38 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 4 (1997) ("Even the international banking law scholar, who has
time for quiet reflection, admits it is 'impossible to keep up.'").
5 Id. at 21.
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promulgated by banking regulators" by examining the architectural
role played by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, outlining
global capital adequacy standards that are currently enforced, and
evaluating proposals to change the present regulatory regime.
Part I addresses the nature of banking, the importance of capital
within the banking system; and the broader question whether capital
regulation is necessary. Part II examines the role, structure, authority,
and international influence of the Basle Committee on Banking Su-
pervision. The current Basle Accord of 1988,7 which has been
adopted by the G-10 nations8 and most other industrialized countries 9
is the subject of Part III, which also details the current regulations and
the policy considerations that led to them. In particular, Part III fo-
cuses on why the current regulatory regime has not achieved the vari-
ous policy goals for which it was designed. Part IV then explains the
1999 proposal by the Basle Committee 10 to amend the 1988 Accord by
allowing, inter alia, a system of private rating agencies and internal
rating methods to replace the current predetermined asset ratings.
This Comment examines the policy rationales behind this new pro-
posal and highlights the strengths and weaknesses of implementing
such a regulatory structure. Part V introduces a second alternative to
the current regulatory regime, proposed by the U.S. Shadow Financial
Regulatory Committee, which would require banks to carry a specific
amount of uninsured, subordinated debt." The Conclusion reiterates
the seven major flaws of the 1988 Basle Accord, and argues that the
6 David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of Interna-
tional Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 281, 282 (1998).
7 See Bank for Int'l Settlements: Basle Comm. on Banking Supervision, Interna-
tional Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (July 1988)
<http://ww.bis.org/publ/index.htm> [hereinafter Basle Accord] (setting out the
guidelines known as the 1988 Basle Capital Accord).
8 The G-10 consists of the "ten industrial nations that agreed in 1962 to lend
money to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). They are Belgium, Canada, France,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Germany," the United Kingdom, and the United
States. HAL S. ScOTt & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANcE: TRANsACTIONs,
POLICYAND REGULATION 1239 (6th ed. 1999).
9 See infra Part III.D (discussing the countries that have adopted the Basle Accord).
'0 See Basle Comm. on Banking Supervision, A New Capital Adequacy Framework
(June 1999) <http://vww.bis.org/publ/index.htm> [hereinafter New Framework] (out-
lining a major revision to the 1988 Accord).
" See U.S. Shadow Fin. Regulatory Comm., International Bank Capital Regulation:
A Flawed System in Need of Reform 29 (Sept. 15, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) [hereinafter Shadow Proposal]; see
also U.S. Shadow Fin. Regulatory Comm., Statement No. 160: Reforming Bank Capital
Regulation (Mar. 2, 2000) <http://www.aei.org/shdw/shdw160.htm> [hereinafter
Statement No. 160] (discussing international bank standards).
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Basle Committee's 1999 Proposal to replace the original Accord with
the New Capital Adequacy Framework ("New Framework") does little to
ameliorate the "seven sins" of the current regime and will even en-
gender additional dilemmas upon its implementation. Operating on
the assumption that bank capital regulation is necessary, this Com-
ment suggests that regulators should consider centering such regula-
tion on a subordinated debt requirement that enhances market disci-
pline. Finally, it argues that the prefatory assumption of the necessity
of bank capital regulation is itself a seemingly flawed premise that
should be scrutinized vigilantly.
I. BANKS, CAPITAL, AND REGULATION
A. The Importance of Banking to the Economy
All market economies rely on the voluntary relationships of
autonomous individuals acting in their self-interest to create wealth
through productive enterprise. 2 For most enterprises, economic in-
puts fundamental to the entity's success are not initially owned by the
enterprise. Entities and individuals contract with one another to form
borrower/saver relationships. Savers provide economic inputs to bor-
rowers who use such inputs to generate economic outputs. Borrow-
ers, in turn, promise a return of their inputs, as well as a portion of
the net output (i.e., principal plus interest), to savers. By serving as
"intermedia[ries] between savers and borrowers," banks have elimi-
13nated much of the inherent inefficiency and risk in this process.
Banks thus "raise funds by issuing their obligations to savers, and pro-
vide these funds to borrowers by acquiring the borrower's obliga-
tions."14 In effect, banks have earned their profits through the interest
rate spread between the rate they pay on deposits and the rate they
charge for loans.
The advent of banks resulted in an "efficient payment system"15
12 See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776) (discussing how societal wealth is generated through the
self-interested pursuits of individuals).
13 TAMAR FRANKEL & CLIFFORD E. KIRscH, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGUILATION
18 (1998).
14 Id.; see also Walter I. Conroy, Note, Risk-Based CapitalAdequacy Guidelines: A Sound
Regulatory Policy or a Symptom of Regulatory Inadequacy?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395, 2412-
13 (1995) ("[Banks] solicit funds in the form of demand deposits and time deposits
from individuals with a surplus of savings and pass these funds on in the form of loans
and investments to companies and individuals who have a deficit of funds.").
" Conroy, supra note 14, at 2412.
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that financed the Industrial Age.16 Today, banks are much larger and
more complex than they were a few hundred years ago, yet their main
function as intermediaries between savers and borrowers remains, and
they continue to flourish. The most significant trend in banking is
"globalization."17 For the past decade, American banks have been es
tablishing branches, subsidiaries, agencies, and representative offices
in foreign countries at astonishing rates, and other nations' banks are
doing the same in the United States. 8 Bank customers are no longer
only individuals and entities from the bank's home country. For ex-
ample, an American bank (intermediary) may loan a British corpora-
tion (borrower) money that was initially deposited by ajapanese bank
(saver). International banking centers have emerged, creating more
competition among banks and expanding the parameters of commer-
cial payment systems.'9 The current legal systems of individual na-
tions, however, are more or less insufficient to address the tumultuous
changes arising from globalization.0
B. The Importance of Capital in Banking
The bank's role as a financial intermediary involves many specific
risks, of which the most predominant is credit risk-that a borrower
will default on a loan.2 On a bank's balance sheet, a loan is classified
16 See NATHAN ROSENBERG & L.E. BiRmzELL, JR., How THE WEST GREW RIcH: TIE
EcoNoMIc TRANSFORMATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD 166 (1986) (stating that in
the Industrial Revolution, "[t]he funding of the factories was facilitated by the English
system of country banks which, by the usual effects of deposit banking, created the
money supply needed for their factory customers' working capital").
17 Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 1; see also SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 8, at
216 (describing the "dramatic growth in banks' international and cross-border activi-
ties").
8 See ScOTT & WELLONS, supra note 8, at 89-90 (describing the "importance of for-
eign banks" to our national economy).
19 See IAN F.G. BAXTER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCE 55-62 (1989) (dis-
cussing the impact of the three major international financial centers, London, New
York, and Tokyo, on banking).
S ee generally RAJ K. BHALA, FOREIGN BANK REGULATION AFTER BCCI 1-23 (1994)
(discussing the virtual ineptness of individual countries' legal systems to regulate the
activities of global banks, especially with regard to the Bank of Credit and Commerce
International ("BCCI"), the world's seventh largest private bank with operations in
over 72 countries, which had engaged in many illegal activities in the 1980s and early
1990s that led to its insolvency).
2' "Credit risk is most simply defined as the potential that a bank borrower or
counterparty will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms." Basle
Comm. on Banking Supervision, Principles for the Management of Credit Risk (July 1999)
<http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm>; see also Thomas W. Albrecht & Sarah J. Smith,
Corporate Loan Securitization: Selected Legal and Regulatory Issues, 8 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L
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as an asset, because it is an entitlement of the bank to receive a certain
amount of money (plus periodic interest payments) on a given date
from a borrower. The main liabilities on a bank's balance sheet are its
deposits, or obligations to reimburse savers on a specified date or
upon demand. The amount of net assets (assets minus liabilities) is
thus the bank's capital.2 Capital is generally "a financial cushion that
absorbs banks' losses and thus protects depositors-or any entity that
insures depositors-from loss."23
L. 411, 414 (1998) ("By far the greatest type of risk incurred in carrying on a banking
business is the credit risk inherent in the holding of long-dated assets, particularly
since the principal funding source of most banks traditionally has been short-dated
deposits."); Basle Papers Set Tone for Sweeping Accord Overhaul, FIN. NEWS, Aug. 2, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 5992124 ("Regulators maintain that credit risk, or the risk of loss
which banks face if a borrower or counterparty to a deal defaults, accounts for any-
thing up to 90% of a bank's overall risk profile. It still represents the greatest threat to
the health of the global banking system."); BIS Reviews Basle Committee Guidelines, EuR.
BANKER, Feb. 24, 1994, at 4 ("Credit risk-that a borrower cannot repay a loan-is still
the main risk facing banks.").
The definition of credit risk can be made even more expansive. See id. ("Credit risk
today, however, now includes such things as exposure to counterparty risk from mar-
gin lending, over-the-counter derivatives, foreign exchange settlement or credit deriva-
tives."). Loan defaults, however, are still the primary component of credit risk.
Besides credit risk, banks are also susceptible to market risk, interest rate risk, li-
quidity risk, and others. Market risk is the "risk of losses in on and off-balance-sheet
positions arising from movements in market prices, including interest rates, exchange
rates and equity values." The Wharton Sch. of Bus., International Banking Glossary 20
(July 21, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review). Interest Rate Risk is the "risk that changes in the market interest rates might
adversely affect an institution's financial condition." Id. at 17. Liquidity Risk is the
"risk that the firm will be unable to fund assets or meet obligations at reasonable cost
or at all; for financial assets, the risk that an instrument cannot be sold or otherwise
exchanged for its full market value." Id. at 19.
22 This refers to "capital" in the academic sense of the term. By contrast, "Regula-
tory Capital" often encompasses long-term liabilities. See infra text accompanying notes
97-104 (noting that regulatory capital can include such diverse instruments as non-
equity capital, bonds that do not mature for some time, as well as common equity).
Regulators often treat debt with a distant maturity date (e.g., 20-30 years) as "quasi-
capital" since there is no obligation to pay savers in the current period.
2 Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 1; see also FRIEDRICH A. HAYFK, THE PURE
THEORY Or CAPITAL 54 (1941) (defining capital as "the aggregate of those non-
permanent resources which can be used only in this indirect manner to contribute to
the permanent maintenance of the income at a particular level"); CHRIS MATTEN,
MANAGING BANK CAPITAL: CAPITAL ALLOCATION AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 7
(1996) ("An essential element of capital is therefore its availability to absorb future,
unidentified losses.").
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Consider the following hypothetical balance sheet
Assets (Loans) $100,000,000 Liabilities (Deposits) $90,000,000
Equity (Capital) $10,000,000
Total: $ Total: $
In this case, the bank has $100,000,000 in loans that it is entitled
to receive from its borrowers. It concurrently has an obligation to pay
its savers $90,000,000 upon withdrawal of their deposits. The
$10,000,000 in capital serves as a 10% default cushion against the out-
standing loans. What would happen if a downturn in the economy or
reckless management caused the borrowers to default on 15% of the
loans? The realized credit risk would then be 15% of total assets.
Consider the revised balance sheet:
Assets (Loans) $85,000,000 Liabilities (Deposits) $90,000,000
Equity (Capital) ($5,000,000)
Total: 8 Total: $8.000
The bank now has the possibility of recovering only $85,000,000,
but its obligations remain $90,000,000. The net worth of the bank is
negative $5,000,000. The test for bank insolvency is simple: "[b]anks
fail when their losses exceed their capital."24 Applying this test, the
negative $5,000,000 net worth is again evident since losses were
$15,000,000 and bank capital was only $10,000,000. In this simplified
hypothetical, the bank only had a 10% capital cushion, a capital ratio
that was inadequate. Capital adequacy2 laws are created to prevent this
very situation.
While the technical function of capital is to ensure that net liabili-
ties do not exceed net assets, capital also functions in more dynamic
ways:
[B]ank capital serves four primary functions. First, it inspires public
confidence in the bank's viability by absorbing unanticipated losses.
Second, it protects uninsured depositors in the event of bank insolvency.
24 Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 6.
SeeJohn W. Head, Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis: The Role of the IMF and
the United States, 7 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 70, 81-82 ("Capital adequacy refers to the
ability of a bank to face risks by relying on amounts that have been paid in by the
shareholders, together with certain other reserves.").
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Third, it pays for the acquisition of physical plants and other resources
necessary to operate the bank. Finally, it serves as a regulatory restraint
on unjustified asset growth.
26
Since adequate capital is a necessary condition for solvent banks,
and solvent banks are fundamental to the world economy, adequate
bank capital is thus essential for a sound economy. Many assert that
"[a] sufficient level of capital backing can cushion the most serious
shocks to the banking system as well as forestalling systemic failure."27
Because adequate bank capital is a vital component of economic sta-
bility, it has become a subject of concern for financial regulatory bod-
ies around the world.
C. Capital Adequacy: Why Government Regulation?
Capital adequacy is not a phenomenon exclusive to banks. Every
business, from a corner snowcone stand to a Fortune 500 company,
possesses the inherent risk of incurring losses that exceed capital.
Government, however, does not interfere with the balance sheets of
operating companies by mandating specific ratios of capital to assets.
Firms are expected to maintain adequate capital the old-fashioned
way-through self-imposed, prudent management. Businesses that
misjudge risks and the capital needed to serve as a buffer against them
either become entirely insolvent or suffer punishment by acquiring
reputations for not paying their debts. Individuals or businesses may
refuse to enter into contractual obligations with a company known to
be lacking in capital, or charge additional rents for the transaction to
compensate for the increased risk. Because of this dynamic function
of free enterprise, imprudent firms are disciplined not by the gov-
ernment, but by the market.2' This reasoning is perhaps the most per-
suasive argument against the necessity of capital adequacy standards.
2'6 Duncan E. Alford, Basle Committee International Capital Adequacy Standards: Analy-
sis and Implications for the Banking Industry, 10 DIC J. INT'L L. 189, 191 (1992) (citing
G. HEMPEL ET AL., BANKMANAGEMENT: TEXT & CASES 272 (3d ed. 1990)).
The Great Banking Capital Conundrum, RETAIL BANKER INT'L, Apr. 30, 1999, at 17,
available in 1999 WL 13038209 [hereinafter Capital Conundrum].
28
[L] osses indicate that the firm has taken important resources and diminished
their value. Losses also help separate people with poor judgment from the
control of resources. One of the market's greatest strengths is its ability to
match greater control over society's resources with those who have the best
ability to make decisions.
WAYNE GABLE & JERRY ELLIG, INTRODUCTION TO MARKET-BASED MANAGEMENT 26
(1993).
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Many economists and legal scholars believe that the market alone,
and not the government, should regulate bank capital. Before the
government ever considered comprehensive capital regulations or
mass deposit insurance, the market was solely responsible for the task:
Before governments protected banks' depositors from loss, banks were
subject to market discipline much like other corporations. Except for
minimum capital requirements at the time a bank was chartered, the
amount of its capital was determined by the market. If depositors be-
lieved that a bank had insufficient capital to protect the par value of
their deposits, they could withdraw their funds. That threat encouraged
banks to maintain sufficient capital, commensurate with their portfolio
risk, to ensure the continued confidence of their depositors, thereby
avoiding a run on the bank that might put it out of business.2
Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises affirmed that "conservatism
and [a] reluctance to expand credit... [are marks of restraint,
which] is the first and supreme rule for the conduct of banking opera-
tions under free banking."0 If the government attempts to set capital
adequacy standards, only three outcomes are possible. First, the gov-
ernment standards could match those of the market. Given the un-
predictability of markets, this outcome is highly unrealistic. Second,
the government capital standards could be lower than the market re-
quires. If this is the case, the bank will either ignore the government
requirements and maintain a larger capital cushion, or it will obey the
regulations at its peril. This situation may cause a moral hazard since
banks could justify imprudent management by arguing that they met
the minimal standards required by law.3' The third possible outcome
is that the regulations could require more than the optimal amount of
capital needed for efficient banking operations. Having a larger capi-
tal cushion than necessary would certainly prevent insolvency (at least
in the short-run), but it would result in higher interest rates on loans
Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 6.
LuDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMIcs 447 (3d ed.
1966). "If the governments had never interfered, the use of banknotes and of deposit
currency would be limited to those strata of the population who know very well how to
distinguish between solvent and insolvent banks." Id. at 448; see also DAVID REISMAN,
TiE POLTcAL EcONOMY OFJAMES BUcHANAN 93-94 (1990) (discussing why the inter-
ference of central banks in regulating other banks causes more harm than good).
3' This moral hazard is especially prevalent in bank capital regulation. "Banking is
a highly leveraged activity. The size of the capital base is a key parameter in determin-
ing potential profitability." Capital Conundrum, supra note 27. If a bank can justify low-
ering its capital, it can make more loans and, at the same time, increase the amount of
deposits for which it is liable.
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and most likely reduce bank profits. Rigid capital adequacy stan-
dards may actually cause banks to fail by overburdening them with
regulations to which their foreign or non-bank competitors are not
subject."3
The question is essentially whether banks should be permitted to
operate as regular corporations with respect to freely managihg their
own levels of capital3 4 Despite cogent arguments against government
regulation of bank capital, regulators have answered "no" and insti-
tuted a regime of capital adequacy rules. The crucial but delicate role
of banks as the central financial intermediaries is the principal reason
that bank capital is regulated while the capital of other companies is
not. 35 There are at least four specific reasons provided by regulators
mandating minimal bank capital. First, a capital cushion can guard
against "runs" by depositors who fear that a bank will be unable to re-
pay its debts.3 6 Second, by requiring a certain ratio of capital to assets,
governments posit that the risk of systemic bank failures will be re-
duced. Since banks are linked together through payment systems, the
collapse of one bank could trigger a domino effect of bank failures.37
32 See MATrEN, supra note 23, at 7 ("[T]he level of capital affects the return re-
quired by shareholders and a bank with a lower capital requirement would be able to
price its products more keenly, as its threshold return would be lower.").
as See The Regulation of International Banking in 11 FINANCIAL CENTRES 5 (1989)
[hereinafter 11 FINANCIAL CENTRES] ("[I]f the requirements shield banks and their
customers from the dangers of an over-aggressive management they cannot shield
them from the possibility of stagnation or the perils of cut-throat competition."); Con-
roy, supra note 14, at 2442 ("When regulators interfere with the market by creating
adequacy guidelines, they do not necessarily ensure the stability of individual banks.").
" SeeJohn J. Mingo, Toward an "Internal Models" Capital Standard for Large Multina-
tional Banking Companies, 80J. LENDING & CREDIT RISK MGMT. 49, 53 (1998) (phrasing
the question as, "should major banks operate with such a high default probability (i.e.,
should they operate as if they were well below investment-grade corporations)?").
There has been some regulation by the SEC and the securities regulation agen-
cies of other nations mandating capital standards for financial services companies such
as investment banks and brokerage houses. SeeScoTr &WELLoNS, supra note 8, at 251
(discussing such regulatory efforts). "The International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) tried to issue common standards for its members but the effort
collapsed in late 1992." Id. at 252. In Europe, entities providing financial services
other than banking are also required to maintain a certain amount of capital as a cush-
ion against losses. "For members of the European Union, the European Commission
issued the Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD) for investment firms and credit institu-
tions in March 1993." Id. at 251.
See Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 6-7 (discussing the potential adverse ef-
fects of runs).
31 See Lawrence L.C. Lee, The Basle Accords As Soft Law: Strengthening International
Banking Superoision, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1998) ("[Olne attendant risk arising from
the growth of financial globalization is the potential for international financial crises
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Third, a safe capital cushion will prevent a taxpayer bailout of the
banking system in nations that have a deposit insurance regime. 8
Fourth, capital adequacy standards, especially if they are international
in scope, will prevent the "race to the bottom" situation stemming
from competition to over-leverage assets.3 9
For the present, pro-regulation arguments have won the day; con-
sequently, many nations favor the institution of capital adequacy stan-
dards for their banks. Many regulators firmly believe that "[c]apital
standards help to ensure the financial strength of internationally ac-
tive banks while promoting greater competition."40 Therefore, it is
important to explore not only the substance of those standards but
also the process from which they arose.
II. THE BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION
Current capital adequacy law is the product of a unique form of
legal process. Because bank capital is a subject for national regula-
tion, capital adequacy law is enacted by central governments. No in-
ternational treaties bind the banks of different nations to maintain a
certain level of capital. The United Nations has not instituted any re-
strictions on commercial banks' balance sheets. Nonetheless, capital
adequacy laws are virtually identical throughout the world.41 The Ba-
sle Committee on Banking Supervision ("Basle Committee") gave
birth to this peerless breed of internationalized national law.
which disrupt macroeconomic performance."). But see Michael Taylor, The Search for a
New Regulatoy Paradigm, 49 MERCER L. REv. 793, 804 (1998) ("The loss of confidence
argument has probably been overstated in a modem economy: there is little evidence
that the failure of one bank leads to a widespread systemic crisis as the result of panic
withdrawals by depositors.").
See Shadow Report, supra note 11, at 8 (noting that "deposit insurance also in-
creases the banking system's tolerance for incompetent bankers who unwittingly in-
crease risk" and who "lower their capital consciously to take advantage of the weaker
depositor discipline produced by government insurance").
3' See Capital Conundrum, supra note 27 (discussing the incentives for banks to fully
leverage their assets absent market discipline guiding them to be more prudent).
40 Susan M. Phillips & Alan N. Rechtschaffen, International Banking Activities: The
Role of the Federal Reserve Bank in Domestic Capital Markets, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1754,
1757 (1998).
41 See infra Part M (discussing the implementation of the 1988 Accord around the
world).
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A. The Perceived Need for an International Standard
Prior to the 1988 Basle Accord, the U.S. Congress had the re-
sponsibility of devising and promulgating the nation's capital ade-
quacy regulations. Because drafting capital adequacy rules required a
deep understanding of banking and economics, Congress shifted rule-
making responsibility to the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal
Reserve by passing the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983
("ILSA") . The new Act allowed the Federal Reserve to discuss capital
adequacy standards with other central banks and encourage the adop-
tion of uniform rules.4 Through the new Act, "Congress essentially
delegated authority to the Federal Reserve to negotiate international
capital adequacy guidelines for commercial banks," illustrating Con-
gress's "hands-off approach to international banking law."5  Even
though the Federal Reserve was authorized to prevent widespread in-
adequate bank capital, it found that promulgating standards for
American banks alone would have little effect on what was a global di-
lemma.46
Since the 1970s, there has been a "dramatic growth in banks' in-
ternational and cross-border activities."47  Many commentators have
remarked that "[c]ross-border activity and the internationalisation of
markets are the main financial evolutions of the end of this century."4 8
When Federal Reserve regulators attempted to impose capital stan-
dards on U.S. banks, it became evident that such standards would fall
short of the original goals of capital regulation. First, many American
individuals and businesses were depositing money in foreign banks
not subject to capital regulations. The Federal Reserve could do very
42 Basle Accord, supra note 7.
43 Pub. L. No. 98-181, tt. IX, § 908, 97 Stat. 1278, 1280 (1983) (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 3901-3912 (1994 & Supp. 111996)).
44 See id. (discussing the powers of the Federal Reserve).
0 Bhala, supra note 4, at 23-24.
46 See MICHAEL GRUSON & RALPH REISNER, I REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS:
UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL 4-4 (1995) (explaining that when the first "risk-
based capital proposal [by the Federal Reserve pursuant to ILSA] was issued for public
comment in early 1986," the consensus "emphasized the importance of achieving uni-
formity of capital standards with other countries").
4 SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 8, at 216; see also Lee, supra note 37, at 10 ("Mod-
em banks conduct diversified operations across borders to diversify their earning
sources and enhance their profits. Advances in data processing and telecommunica-
tions have enabled banks to offer global services easily, even without establishing a
physical presence in some markets.").
48 Pierre Fleuriot, Financial Regulation As the Safeguard of Balances in a Global Context,
in RNANCIAL MARKETS REGULATION 33, 33 (Alainjeunemaitre ed., 1997).
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little to prevent "runs" on these banks. Second, and more impor-
tantly, the danger of systemic risk was global and no longer within the
confines of any national border.49 Thus, even if capital standards were
imposed on American banks, the insolvency of a major Japanese or
European bank could cause U.S. banks to fail as well.50 Third, since
deposit insurance regimes were not instituted multilaterally, U.S. tax-
payers may have had to face the bailout of U.S. banks failing as a result
of foreign bank failures in other nations. Finally, the imposition of
purely American capital adequacy standards may have curbed U.S.
banks from racing to the bottom, but unregulated foreign banks
would have continued the race, effectively gaining market share by of-
fering higher interest rates to depositors and lower interest charges to
borrowers as a result of retaining less capital. Not only would U.S.
banks competing abroad be injured by such standards, but foreign
banks wishing to establish U.S. subsidiaries (subject to U.S. banking
regulations) would be deterred from doing so.51
The Federal Reserve simply decided that "the traditional regula-
tory paradigm [had] become outmoded."52 A major disjunction be-
tween the regulations and the regulated occurred: "banking [was] in-
ternational, while banking regulation [was] national" in scope. 3 If
capital adequacy regulation was going to comprise an effective legal
regime, then regulators believed that it needed to be international in
scope. Other nations were recognizing that many Cold War problems
ameliorated by national solutions were becoming increasingly difficult
to solve in the new post-Cold War era of economic globalization.,
49 See Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 1-2 ("[B]ecause international banks were
active in multiple countries and were linked together through common clearing and
settlement systems... the failure of one or more of these institutions in one country
could adversely affect the financial welfare of other institutions in other countries.").
0 See 11 FINANcIAL GENTREs, supra note 33, at 5 ("[T]he banking system is interna-
tional; the failure of a bank in Frankfurt could affect the banking system around the
world."); see also F.R. RYDER, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 49-52
(1987) (discussing problems international bankers faced in the years preceding the
Basle Accord).
51 See Thomas F. McInerney II, Note, Towards the Next Phase in International Banking
Regulation, 7 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 143, 170 (1994) ("Naturally, the tighter the regulatory
structure, the less attractive a country becomes for foreign banks.").
52 Taylor, supra note 37, at 793.
'3 Lee, supra note 37, at 32.
m See Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of Sovereignty:
The Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 425, 428
(1999) ("The extensive international effort to regulate environmental, health, weap-
ons, and even human rights standards bears witness to this trend toward international
regulation. But nowhere is this demand for regulation more apparent than in the in-
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The field of banking was no exception. International law, although
very expansive in nature, is burdensome to forge. Such a process re-
quires, at a minimum, a meeting of sovereign nations whose represen-
tatives negotiate the construction of doctrines and pledge to be bound
by them.5 Indeed, developing "hard"56 international law can take
years or even decades.
Apart from the difficult process of establishing international law
to regulate bank capital, the Federal Reserve faced another problem.
Many nations were circumspect to enter into agreements to establish
rigid capital standards, fearing that doing so would doom the com-
petitiveness of their respective banks.5' For example, if one country
submits to binding regulation, but its neighbor or main competitor is
free from capital regulation, the commercial banks of the unbound
nation may be able to achieve a strategic advantage. Such a competi-
tive advantage would certainly be evident if the two nations' regulatory
systems were basically equal in all other respects. Even though U.S.
banks could probably endure such regulation without losing signifi-
cant market share, the ability of foreign banks to bear the disadvan-
tage of uneven regulation is much more doubtful.
Nonetheless, if capital adequacy regulation was to take on a global
scope, two nations needed to make the first move toward regulatory
integration. Even in the absence of "hard" international law, "finan-
cial globalization and liberalization... created a need for banks and
banking supervisors to adopt international standards rather than fol-
lowing a series of purely domestic regulations."59 The United States
and the United Kingdom made this first move toward integration
when "the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Englande] entered into
ternational financial sphere.").
5 See DANIEL G. PARTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCESS 86 (1992) (defining
.general international law" as "rules of law that bind all members of the international
community even though such rules have not been established by state practice");
BURNs H. WESTON ET AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 11 (2d ed. 1990)
("'International law governs relations between independent States.'" (quoting S.S. Lo-
tus (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7))).
'6 See Lee, supra note 37, at 7 (discussing the distinction between "hard" interna-
tional law, which "places obligations on members," and "soft" international law).
57 See PARTAN, supra note 55, at 85 (noting that rules of international law are
"rarely easily established'" (quoting Daniel G. Partan, The "DuEy To Inform" in Interna-
tionalEnvironmentalLaw, 6 B.U.INT'L L.J. 43, 64 (1988))).
58 See McInerney, supra note 51, at 170 ("The political difficulties involved in creat-
ing an agreement among various states on supervisory standards are heightened by
intertwined issues of competitiveness.").
59 Lee, supra note 37, at 2.
W The Bank of England is the central bank of the United Kingdom. It performs
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an agreement to implement common risk-based capital standards for
banks in their respective countries"61 in January 1987. In little more
than a year from the date of the United States-United Kingdom
agreement, the remaining Group of Ten ("G-10") nations followed
suit by adopting the capital adequacy standards issued by the Basle
Committee.
B. The Basle Committee: The Club of Giants
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision is a "standing
committee of the central bank governors of the Group of Ten
("G-10") countries" that convenes at the Bank for International Set-
tiements ("BIS") in Basle, Switzerland.62 The Basle Committee's ob-
jective is to eradicate the worrisome disjunction between the interna-
tional banking system and the plethora of national banking
regulations that have failed to restrain it. To this end, the Committee,
along with its permanent staff at the BIS, engages in the research and
study of international banking and makes recommendations to the
governors of the G-10 central banks on how to better supervise and
regulate banking activities with cross-border repercussions.6 Since its
founding, the Committee has published numerous papers" and held
conferences attended by "bank supervisors from over 100 countries."
65
During its first ten years, the Basle Committee simply coordinated
matters of regulatory and supervisory procedure.66 Since capital ade-
quacy rules are substantive, they were beyond the initial scope of the
functions similar to those of the U.S. Federal Reserve.
61 Alford, supra note 26, at 195-96.
62 ScoTr & WELLONS, supra note 8, at 217. The BIS was originally established in
1930 as a financial entity to oversee the payment of reparations resulting from the First
World War. See id. at 1233 (describing the BIS as "[a]n international bank originally
established in 1930 as a financial institution to coordinate the payment of war repara-
tions between European central banks"); Bank for International Settlements-Information
About the BIS (last modified Jan. 2000) <http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm> (ex-
plaining the history of the BIS). Today, the BIS sponsors the Basle Committee in the
limited capacity of secretariat. See id. (providing a profile and general information on
the BIS). As secretariat, the BIS provides both a neutral forum for debate and support
staff to maintain the Committee's communications with the world. The BIS initiated
its sponsorship of the Committee in 1976, endeavoring to "coordinate banking super-
vision in member countries." ScoTT & WELLONS, supra note 8, at 217.
See ScoTr & WELLONS, supra note 8, at 217 (discussing the relationship between
the Committee and G-10 central bankers).
See Bank for International Settlements (visited Mar. 4, 2000) <http://www.bis.org/
publ/index.htm> (listing the Basle Committee's publications during the past decade).
ScoTr & WELLONS, supra note 8, at 217.
66 See i&
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Committee's activities. This would soon change.
The members of the Basle Committee are all central bankers7
whose governments depend on their expertise and consequently
delegate immense regulatory authority to them.& This regulatory
authority often includes the ability to establish capital adequacy stan-
dards for commercial banks. The transition of the Committee toward
designing substantive rules for international capital adequacy was im-
minent. The Federal Reserve and its counterparts now had a mecha-
nism whereby capital adequacy regulation could be standardized
among the most sophisticated international financial systems. In
1988, the Committee issued a paper on the "International Conver-
gence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards,"9 which essen-
tially prescribed a substantive set of risk-based capital adequacy stan-
dards. These standards have been adopted by the respective nations
through their central bankers represented on the Basle Committee. 0
The Basle Committee is relatively unknown, in comparison to its
indisputable influence.7 ' This is partly by design.n The Basle Coin-
67 Membership in the committee is limited. The institutions represented on the
Basle Supervisors Committee are:
Belgium: National Bank of Belgium, Banking Commission
Canada: Bank of Canada, Office of the Inspector General of Banks
France: Bank of France, Banking Commission
Germany: Deutsche Bundesbank, Federal Banking Supervisory Office
Italy: Bank of Italy
Japan: Bank ofJapan, Ministry of Finance
Luxembourg: Luxembourg Monetary Institute
Netherlands: The Netherlands Bank
Sweden: Sveriges Riksbank, Royal Swedish Banking Inspectorate
Switzerland: Swiss National Bank, Swiss Federal Banking Commission
United Kingdom: Bank of England
United States: Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Secretariat: Bank for International Settlements
JOSEPH JUDE NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS 176
n.18 (1995).
68 The immense delegation of regulatory responsibility to central banks is espe-
cially true in the United States. "While the Federal Reserve is subject to familiar ad-
ministrative law constraints, as a practical matter, neither Congress nor the judiciary is
likely to overrule its exercise of discretion in the international banking arena. In prac-
tice, legal power lies with the domestic regulators." Bhala, supra note 4, at 25.
69 Basle Accord, supra note 7.
70 See infra Part III (describing current regulations adopted by the Committee).
71 See Zaring, supra note 6, at 288.
7 "The Basle Committee operates in secret and has sought throughout its exis-
tence to maintain an unpublicized existence and a low profile." Zaring, supra note 6,
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mittee is neither a national organization of any country, nor an official
international regulatory agency like a United Nations committee or
one created by treaty. Apart from its significance in regulating bank
capital, the Basle Committee is redefining the field of international
law. Most legal scholars would classify the Basle Committee as an "in-
ternational financial regulatory organization" ("IFRO").7 Such "or-
ganizations do not meet the traditional legal definition of an interna-
tional organization, which applies only to organizations composed of
states and constituted by formal treaty. IFROs nonetheless promul-
gate important legal rules and have successfully pursued sophisticated
international cooperation." 74 While many international organizations,
both traditional and non-traditional, have increased their member-
ship to include representation from nations expressing interest, the
Basle Committee has chosen to keep its circle exclusive. Although the
Basle Committee has sought to "extend its 'influence'.on a near global
basis," it has also "made the conscious decision not to expand its
membership beyond its original limited group."75 The Basle Commit-
tee is truly a club of giants.
C. The Basle Accord As "Soft Law"
The Basle Committee lacks the authority to actually make law.
The pronouncements of the Committee, however, are nearly always
uniformly incorporated into the national regulatory regimes of the G-
7 .610 nations and many other countries around the world. The process
by which capital adequacy standards are devised and become law in-
volves four major steps. First, the members of the Committee call the
membership's attention to pressing issues in capital adequacy regula-
tion and draft proposals for regulation. Second, the Committee issues
Consultative Papers detailing its proposal to change capital standards
and requests the submission of comments by governments, banks,
academics, and other interested parties.77 Most publications and Con-
sultative Papers are available to the members of the general public via
at 288.
73 Id. at 285.
7 Id.
NORTON, supra note 67, at 229.
76 See infra Part Ill.D (discussing the implementation of capital adequacy standards
and noting that the standards were adopted by statute in the United States, Europe,
and eventually much of Asia).
See Bank for International Settlements (last modified Jan. 2000)
<http://www.bis.org/contact.htm> (giving instructions to interested parties on how to
file comments concerning the Basle Committee's Consultative Papers).
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the Basle Committee's portion of Bank of International Settlements'
Internet site.78  The upsurge of Internet users has pressured the
Committee to unveil much of its activities and proposals directly to
the public.79 Third, the Committee collects the comments, evaluates
them, and amends the Consultative Papers when necessary." Fourth,
the members unanimously agree to work to implement the standards
in their respective countries. Thus, "' [w]ithout in any way approach-
ing the legal status of a treaty,... [an] agreement is considered to be
binding on its members.'"81
The final step, implementation of the standards by members of
the Committee, is what sets the Basle Committee apart from official
international law-making bodies. Despite its lack of official law-
making power, the Basle Committee is, in fact, the generator of inter-
national capital adequacy standards; home country enactment is sim-
ply a formality. The policies are essentially created by the members of
this club of giants. Thus, some commentators have glibly referred to
this new genre of legal species as "club" law.
Largely due to the prestige and institutional power of its membership,
the regulatory standards that emanate under the Committee's auspices
enjoy a far wider legitimacy than would be justified by their doubtful le-
gal status. Through their defacto implementation by the represented in-
stitutions within the limits of their discretionary powers, but also through
their formal adoption by national legislators, Committee pronounce-
ments, despite their lack of formal force, exert in practice a very power-
78 See Bank for International Settlements (last modified Apr. 19, 2000)
<http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm>.
79 Before the growth of the Internet, the general public was often excluded from
viewing the Committee's proposals. This was especially true during the drafting and
promulgation process of the 1988 Accord:
[T]he Basle Committee issue [d] Consultative Papers to national central banks
and banking supervisors, not to the international financial sector. Each cen-
tral bank then determine[d] how comments [would] be collected domesti-
cally and transmit[ted] summaries of responses to the Basle Committee. This
filtering of responses through national central banks was consistent with the
Basle Committee's original mandate of providing a forum for discussion by
bank regulators of domestic supervisory standards, because the focus was on
regulations at the national level.
Barbara C. Matthews, Capital Adequacy, Netting and Derivatives, 2 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN.
167, 189-90 (1995).
80 This process is similar to the process of administrative rulemaking in the United
States. See Administrative Procedure Act § 676, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (outlining the
process of notice and comment for federal regulatory agencies).
81 Zaring, supra note 6, at 289 (quoting Charles Freeland, The Work of the Basle
Committee, in 2 CURRENT LEGAL IsSUES AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS 231, 233 (Robert C.
Effros ed., 1994)).
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ful influence in the generation of national and regional legal rules and
formal institutional structures. The process could be described as the
inculcation of formal legal systems by central bankers' "club" law.8
2
Classifying this "multibillion-dollar global regulatory scheme" into
a specific genre of legislative process is difficult. There are two prin-
cipal reasons why the fourth step of the law-making process is more
ceremonial than substantive. First, as mentioned above, central bank-
ers enjoy a great deal of regulatory freedom83 Second, "[d]espite its
insistence on informality, the Basle Committee has designed methods
intended to compel its members to apply the regulations it promul-
gates to their banks upon their return from committee meetings."8'4
The fraternal milieu of the Committee creates a certain degree of syn-
ergy among its members. This synergy, when combined wvith each
representative's extensive rule-making power, results in an interna-
tional convergence of national regulations.
Some scholars have emphasized the importance of the Basle
Committee as a model for future regulatory reform, more precisely
classifying its legal product as "soft law."t "Soft law refers to a set of
legal terms or informal duties adopted under formal or informal trea-
ties or multilateral agreements. The emergence of soft law resulted
from the inadequacy of hard law, which cannot overcome deadlocks
in international relations that result from economic or political differ-
ences. "8 6 Such soft law commitments are non-binding8 7 Officially, the
documents issued by the Basle Committee are termed "Accords" or
"Concordats," which illustrate their political importance, but divest
them of binding legal authority. s At last, bank regulators hoping to
create international capital adequacy standards could avoid the two
recurring problems: the lack of cooperation among nations and the
arduous process of instituting international laws. The solution was
2 Christos D. Hadjiemmanuil, Central Bankers' "Club" Law and Transitional Econo-
mies: Banking Reform and the Reception of the Basle Standards of Prudential Supervision in
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, in EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE
ROLE oF INTERNATIoNAL FINANCIAL ORGANIZATIONS 179, 184 (Joseph J. Norton &
Mads Andenas eds., 1996).
"See generally supra note 68 (describing the degree of latitude afforded the Federal
Reserve by the U.S. Congress in promulgating capital adequacy standards).
M Zaring, supra note 6, at 290.
5Lee, supra note 37, at 7.
Id. at 3-4.
87 Id. at 7 ("Unlike a hard law which places obligations on members, a soft law
places no legally binding duties on the signatories.").
Matthews, supra note 79, at 184 ("These terms recognize that the documents are
not treaties carrying the force of law.").
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combining the dynamically unified Committee with the institution of
soft law.
This combination permits "banks from different countries with
different domestic banking regulations to work together under one
set of international banking standards. "" Despite its exclusivity, the
Basle Committee, according to some scholars, has actually increased
the forum for debating capital adequacy issues by equipping "the pri-
vate sector with an additional opportunity to change parallel domestic
regulation to which they are opposed."0 Whether one likes or dislikes
the process through which this club of giants regulates bank capital, it
is evident that "expanding the role of the Basle Committee offers the
possibility of reaching the goal of strengthening supervision of inter-
national banking worldwide without the imposition of a new legal
framework or interference with national sovereignty. 91 Consequently,
the Basle Committee may be the model for future regulatory conver-
gence of national economic laws. While the rule-making process of
the Basle Committee may be a step toward progress for international
financial regulation, the rules themselves clearly are not.
III. CURRENT CAPITAL ADEQUACY REGULATIONS
The current capital adequacy regulation is a codified version of
the 1988 Basle Accord. When outlining the current capital adequacy
rules, this Comment will cite to the 1988 Accord and U.S. regulations
where relevant. The regulations of other nations are materially the
same as U.S. regulations and the Accord.
A. The Philosophy of the 1988 Basle Accord
When the Basle Committee decided to initiate international con-
vergence of capital adequacy standards, it sought to achieve two goals:
(1) strengthening bank capital requirements to reduce credit risk,
93
• 94
and (2) leveling the playing field among member nations. Achieving
89 Lee, supra note 37, at 4.
"0 Matthews, supra note 79, at 187.
91 Lee, supra note 37, at 6.
9 See 12 C.FR. § 208.4 (1999) (stating the U.S. regulations regarding bank capital
adequacy).
9' See id. § 208 app. A (noting that "[t]he risk-based capital ratio focuses principally
on broad categories of credit risk, although the framework for assigning assets and off-
balance-sheet items to risk categories does incorporate elements of transfer risk, as well
as limited instances of interest rate and market risk").
See Basle Accord, supra note 7, 8 (stating that the first goal of the Accord is to
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the second goal required uniform implementation of the rules
throughout the member nations. Achievement of the first goal would
involve more thought. The Basle Committee decided that, apart from
uniformity, there were three major components of an effective capital
adequacy regulatory regime.
The first component was an official risk weighting of assets.9 5 Be-
fore that time, many nations simply required banks to allocate a per-
centage of their capital to all assets on an equal basis, regardless of the
risks associated with the different loans and other asset types. 6 Con-
sequently, two banks in the same country would have to hold the same
amount of capital against a $100,000,000 loan even if one bank loaned
to the central government and the other to a risky "start-up" company.
Banks argued that such non-risk-based capital requirements were un-
fair to those who prudently lent to safer borrowers. Without risk-
based standards, banks had an incentive to loan to risky borrowers at
higher rates of interest, since the capital required per asset dollar was
the same no matter who the borrower.
Second, the Basle Committee introduced the concept of "regula-
tory" capital.97 Regulatory capital consists simply of balance sheet
items which regulators deem to be capital.98 One major problem in
international banking and finance is that national accounting meth-
ods vary significantly from one country to another." This divergence
in accounting standards resulted in various definitions of capital being
used in different nations.00 Thus, the universal adoption of a rule re-
quiring a fixed percentage of capital, even when apportioned to assets
on the basis of risk, would not alone ensure uniformity and stability
since the same instrument could be classified as capital in one nation
"strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system").
9' See id. 1 28-43 (outlining the weighted risk approach).
96 See ScoTT & WELLONS, supra note 8, at 218 (noting "the practice of using a fixed
percentage of the value of the asset regardless of its risk").
9 See BasleAccord, supra note 7, 1 12-27 (discussing what constitutes the regulatory
definition of capital).
93 See id. 1 14 (defining regulatory capital as consisting of at least 50% "of equity
capital and published reserves from post-tax retained earnings ([T]ier 1)" with the re-
maining elements consisting of supplementary capital (Tier 2)).
9See generally, . FRA & C. LEE, ACCOUNTING DIVERSITY AND INTERNATIONAL
VALUATION (NYSE Working Paper No. 96-01, 1996) (discussing differences among na-
tional accounting methods); M. ZAFAR IQBAL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL AccOUNTING: A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (1997) (same); Sir Bryan Carberg, Global Issues and Implement-
ing Core International Accounting Standards: Where Lies IASC's Final Goal?, Address
to the Japanese Institute of CPA's (Oct. 23, 1998) (same).
"0 See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 8, at 225 (noting that "[c]ountries differed so
much in their definitions that it was essential to define capital").
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and a liability in another. Furthermore, classification as regulatory
capital is based less on the instrument's residual interest in the assets
and more on its maturity date.' A debt instrument, even a long-term
bond, would normally be classified as a liability on a bank's balance
sheet. After all, bonds are "debts or obligations of an entity that have
arisen from past transactions.'0 2 Since long-term bonds will not ma-
ture for a substantial period of time, however, they present no risk of
current redemption. Therefore, even non-equity instruments can
serve as regulatory capital, building the "financial cushion that ab-
sorbs banks' losses and thus protects depositors."03 The Basle Com-
mittee posited that some forms of regulatory capital, especially com-
mon equity, form a stronger cushion than other forms because of
their residual nature. Consequently, the Committee divided regula-
tory capital into two tiers-Tier I and Tier II-with restrictions placed
on the amount of Tier II, the less residual capital, that could be in-
104cluded in the minimal legal cushion.
Third, the Basle Committee wanted to be certain that all activities
exposing banks to credit risk'0 s were incorporated in the determina-
tion of the amount of capital banks were required to hold. "During
the early 1980s... commercial banks sought more business for which
they could charge fees without generating liabilities or assets. ""'
These activities, which do not require the posting of official journal
entries to the balance sheet, are known as off-balance-sheet ("OBS")
items.' 7 Measures were taken to guard against the risks associated
with the OBS items, such as applying credit conversion factors to these
items so they could be treated in a similar manner as risk-weighted as-
'01 Capital (owner's equity) is described as "[t]he amount of an owner's net in-
vestment in a business plus profits from successful operations which have been re-
tained in the business." MEIGs & MEIGS, supra note 3, at 39.
1o Id.
'0' Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 1.
'04 See 12 C.F.R. § 208 app. A (1999) (discussing the specifics of Tier 1 and Tier 2
capital); Basle Accord, supra note 7,1 14 (same).
0'0 For a definition of credit risk, see supra note 21.
100 ScoTr & WELLONS, supra note 8, at 230.
107 Off-balance-sheet items are "[blanks' business, often fee-based, that does not
generally involve booking assets and taking deposits. Examples are trading of swaps,
options, foreign exchange forwards, standby commitments and letters of credit." The
Wharton Sch. of Bus., supra note 21, at 23; see also ScoTr & WELLONS, supra note 8, at
232 ("Off-balance sheet [sic] items are obligations of banks that may or may not be
called, such as bank guarantees. These contingent liabilities depend on some action or
event for the bank to pay.").
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sets when apportioning capital."' In this manner, transactions affect-
ing overall credit risk, but not the balance sheet, would be included in
the assessment of bank capital necessary to sustain safe and stable op-
erations. The Committee's twin goals of establishing risk-based capital
standards and creating a level playing field are evident as the guiding
principles of the technical rules that follow.
B. The Required Capital Ratio
Under the Basle Accord, the general rule is that all banks must
maintain a ratio of 8% capital to the total amount of risk-weighted as-
sets and credit-converted OBS items.19 More specifically, capital is di-
vided into Tier 1 and Tier 2. Tier 1 Capital "[m]ust equal or exceed
4% of weighted risk assets," including OBS conversions.1 The
"[t]otal of Tier 2 [capital] is limited to 100% of Tier 1.""' The Accord
also requires the following items to be deducted from the sum of Tiers
1 and 2 before the ratio of 8% can be assessed: (1) "Investments in
unconsolidated subsidiaries," (2) "Reciprocal holdings of banking or-
ganizations' capital securities," and (3) "Other deductions.., as de-
termined by [the] supervisory authority."
1 2
The types of instruments comprising Tiers 1 and 2 and their spe-
cific restrictions are summarized below.
CORE CAPITAL (TIER 1)"3
Common Stockholder's Equity - No limit
Qualified, noncumulative, perpetual preferred - No limitl
' See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text (discussing the specifics of credit-
conversion factors).
'o9 See Basle Accord, supra note 7, 1 44 (explaining the general rule and the target
standard ratio).
10 12 C.F.R. § 208 app. A, attachment II (1999).
I Id.
112 Id.
"s See iL (showing that "[g]oodwill and other intangible assets" must be deducted
from the total of Tier 1).
114 There is no stated limit on noncumulative, perpetual preferred stock, but the
Committee offered this caveat: "[B]anks should avoid undue reliance on preferred
stock in Tier 1." Id.
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SUPPLEMENTARY CAPITAL (TIER 2)11s
Allowance for loan and lease losses - Limited to 1.25% of
weighted-risk assets
Perpetual preferred stock - No limit within Tier 2
Hybrid capital instruments and equity contract notes - No
limit within Tier 2
Subordinated debt and intermediate-term preferred stock -
limited to 50% of Tier 1 (original weighted average
maturity of 5 years or more)
Thus, the division of capital into two tiers illustrates that banking
regulators have a preference for more residual instruments with a
perpetual existence. The requirement that half of the ratio be com-
posed of Tier 1 capital illustrates the Basle Committee's attempted
preemptive strike against the misuse of capital definitions by highly
leveraged banks. The individual restrictions within Tier 2 also estab-
lish the boundaries within which long-term debt instruments (subor-
dinated debt and intermediate-term preferred stocks) and contra-
assets (allowance for loan and lease losses) can be used to establish an
adequate capital cushion. With a more precise definition of regula-
tory capital incorporated into the Accord, the Basle Committee felt
reassured that the goal of achieving a level playing field could be
more easily achieved.
C. The Risk-Rating Rules
Distinct from the problem of arriving at a universal definition of
capital was the further complication that banks also possessed assets
with varying degrees of credit risk. To avoid a single blanket risk of
100%, the Basle Committee separated the various loans and other as-
sets into categories based on an approximation of risk.16 The risk
categories for on-balance sheet assets are divided into four groups:
0%, 20%, 50%, and 100%.117 These four groups roughly correspond
to the debt of "central governments, public sector entities, banks and
11 See id. Revaluation reserves were excluded from Tier 2 capital until October
1998, when less than 50% on specific gains were allowed. SeeScoTr & WELLONS, supra
note 8, at 224 (discussing the 1998 amendment allowing the inclusion of"up to 45% of
pretax net unrealized holding gains").
116 See 12 G.F.R. § 208 app. A, attachment III (1999) (laying out the "Summary of
Risk Weights and Risk Categories for State Member Banks").
1,7 See id. (delineating the various categories of risk for on-balance sheet assets).
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non-bank corporates and for the first three of these certain distinc-
dons are made between OECD1118 1 and non-OECD counterparties."" 9
These risk-based assets were, as stated above, complemented by a list
of credit-conversion factors used to assess the impact of a bank's OBS
items.12 "The conversion factors are applied to the nominal principal
amount of exposure to produce a credit equivalent amount which in
turn is weighted according to the category of the counterparty."
1 2
1
In applying these extremely technical regulations, a bank must
understand the basic equation for deriving its mandatory capital ratio.
"A bank's risk-based capital ratio is calculated by dividing its qualifying
capital (the numerator of the ratio) by its weighted-risk assets (the
denominator)."'12 Therefore, one must first evaluate how much of the
bank's capital qualifies as Tier 1. Once the total amount of Tier 1
regulatory capital is established, the bank can evaluate how much of
its equity and long-term debt can comprise its Tier 2 holdings, since
the amount of certain instruments in Tier 2 are limited to a fixed per-
centage of Tier 1. Moreover, the entire dollar amount of Tier 2 can-
not exceed that of Tier 1. Once the numerator is established, one
next identifies the value of the bank's weighted-risk assets through a
three-step process. First, all assets on the balance sheet must be indi-
vidually multiplied by the percentage of their corresponding risk
category and then summed. Second, all OBS items must be individu-
ally multiplied by their respective credit-conversion factor and then
summed. Third, both sums are added together, resulting in the total
risked-weighted assets (denominator), which encompasses bank activi-
ties on and off the balance sheet. Finally, the bank's calculated regu-
latory capital is divided by the total amount of risk-weighted assets and
activities. This result is a decimal that is converted into a percentage.
The bank must have an 8% ratio or higher to satisfy the standards of
the Basle Accord.
18 The OECD is the:
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Its members are
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom
and the United States.
The Wharton Sch. of Bus., supra note 21, at 22.
"9 PETER CooKE, BANK CAPrrAL ADEQUACYAND CAPITAL CONVERGENCE 6 (1991).
'2' See 12 C.F.R. § 208 app. A, attachment IV (1999) (laying out the "Credit Conver-
sion Factors for Off Balance-Sheet Items for State Member Banks").
1 1 CooKE, supra note 119, at 6.
12 12 C.F.R. § 208 app. A (1999).
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Once a bank's capital ratio reaches 8% of risk-rated assets and
credit-converted OBS items, the bank may still be required to add
more capital to its cushion. "The risk-based capital guidelines estab-
lish minimum ratios of capital to weighted-risk assets."'2 The Federal
Reserve has stated:
[Tihe final supervisory judgment on a bank's capital adequacy may dif-
fer significantly from conclusions that might be drawn solely from the
level of its risk-based capital ratio.... [Blanks generally are expected to
operate well above the minimum risk-based ratios. In particular, banks
contemplating significant expansion proposals are expected to maintain
strong capital levels substantially above the minimum ratios and should
not allow significant diminution of financial strength below these strong
levels to fund their expansion plans.1
24
Thus, the Basle Accord resulted in an international standard that
set a baseline capital cushion for commercial banks, but also provided
subscribing nations with a significant degree of discretion to impose
additional requirements.
D. Implementation of Basle CapitalAdequacy Standards
Once the Committee's members agreed on the technical risk-
weighted methods forming the Basle Accord, each representative bore
the responsibility of incorporating the new standards into the regula-
tions of his home country.1 2s In the United States, the Federal Reserve
immediately issued regulations mirroring the Accord. At the time of
their adoption, the standards, which were converted into new regula-
tions, encountered little resistance from the U.S. Congress or the fed-
eral judiciary. In fact, further adjustments and enforcement of the
promulgated capital adequacy standards have been bequeathed solely
to the Federal Reserve:
Most judges and congresspersons, however, pay little attention to, and
have little knowledge of, international banking law. It is likely that many
are unaware of the [Basle Committee's] existence and importance, and
few know much about Federal Reserve functions aside from setting and
implementing monetary policy. Capital adequacy rules are sure to ap-
pear byzantine to judges and congresspersons, and, unless widespread
123 Id.
124 Id.
'2' See supra Part II.C (discussing the process by which the Basle standards become
law).
126 See 12 C.F.R. § 208 (1988) (outlining the first regulations promulgated in accor-
dance with the new Basle standard).
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public confidence in the banking system is at stake, they will not boost
the re-election prospects of legislators.
127
Central bankers in countries other than the United States also eas-
ily incorporated the Basle standards into their respective regulatory
regimes. The Accord was adopted promptly in Europe. In the United
Kingdom, the Bank of England promulgated capital adequacy stan-
dards akin to those in the Accord.128 Representatives on the Basle
Committee who were members of the European Community ("EC")129
prompted "two capital adequacy directives' s" that were issued by the
Council of Ministers in 1988: the Own Funds Directive 3 11 and the
Solvency Ratio Directive. 12 1 "11 "The Directive on Solvency Ratios
constrains the own funds of a credit institution to at least 8% of its
risk-weighted assets."13 Member nations of the EC were legally bound
to adopt the standards specified in the Directives by promulgating na-
tional banking regulations by a specified date. After the United
States and Europe implemented the Basle standards, many other na-
tions would be pressured into adopting the Accord as well. An infor-
mal process exists whereby "Basle members challenge non-Basle
members, whose banks want to do business in Basle members' coun-
tries, to adopt the Basle Accord's principles." ts Within a few short
' Bhala, supra note 4, at 23.
'2 See Convergence of Capital Adequacy in the UK and US, 27 BANKENG. Q. BuLL. 85
(1987) (highlighting the Bank of England's preemptive adoption of the Basle Accord
before its final issuance in 1988).
'2 The European Community is "[n]ow known as [the] EU or European Union."
SCoTr & WELLONS, supra note 8, at 1236.
'" "An EC directive creates a general binding obligation upon member states, but
it leaves to each state the means by which to fulfill the obligation." Afford, supra note
26, at 205.
'3' See Council Directive 89/299 of 17 April 1989 on the Own Funds of Credit Insti-
tutions, 1989 OJ. (L 124) 16.
152 See Council Directive 89/647 of 18 December 1989 on a Solvency Ratio for
Credit Institutions, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 14; see also Michael Gruson & Wolfgang Feuring,
The New Banking Law of the European Economic Community, 25 INT'L LAW. 1, 28 (1991)
("The Solvency Ratio Directive represents the EEC's version of the capital adequacy
rules of the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices. ..
I Afford, supra note 26, at 205.
,5 PfInIp MoLYNEux ET AL., EFFICIENCY IN EUROPEAN BANKING 24 (1996) (cita-
tions omitted). "The capital adequacy requirements established by the Directive are in
line with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) proposals." Id.
"5 See supra note 130 (describing the binding effect of European Community Di-
rectives on member nations).
"6 Lee, supra note 37, at 32-33. "The Basle Accords have become the standard for
international financial services regulations throughout the industrialized world. Bank-
ing institutions in non-Basle member countries that wish to do business with Basle
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years, the Basle standards had spread to the banks of non-G-10 coun-
tries.
Several countries in Asia were the first non-G-10 countries to in-
corporate the risk-weighted capital ratios into their national banking
regulations. Commercial banking authorities in East Asia also man-
dated the Basle standards. Hong Kong, which has nearly always been
an international financial center, adopted the Basle Accord after the
Hong Kong Monetary Authority ("HKMA") decided incorporating the
new standards would be beneficial to the state.'s In 1997, when the
Asian financial crisis was at its pinnacle, the International Monetary
Fund 13 suggested to some countries that adoption of the Basle stan-
dards would help bring stability to their national banking systems.
"[U]nder the IMF-supported reform program, Korea pledged ... to
set a timetable for all [of its] banks to meet or exceed Basle standards
on capital adequacy . . .. , Some nations, such as Singapore,
adopted the basic standards of Basle but increased the capital ratio to
provide a greater capital cushion against credit risk. "[T]o maintain
the financial soundness of locally-incorporated banks, local banks
were statutorily required to maintain a minimum Tier-1 capital ade-
quacy ratio of twelve percent even though the [Basle Accord] was set
at eight percent (based on Tier 1 and Tier 2) .
The advancement of the Basle standards in Asia has led former
member countries are likely to comply with the Basle Accords." Id. at 5.
117 For example, "India adopted them as part of the financial reforms package in
1992." S. Venkitaramanan, Basle Revisits Risks, Bus. LjNE (Hindu), July 5, 1999, avail-
able in 1999 WL 21232504.
'm See Berry Fong-Chung Hsu, Legislative Control of Hong Kong Financial Markets:
Some Aspects of Banking and Securities Regulations, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 649, 676
(1997) (noting that the Basle Accord is the new capital adequacy regime in Hong
Kong and reporting that "[a]ll authorized institutions incorporated in Hong Kong
must maintain a capital adequacy ratio of eight percent, as calculated in accordance
with the provisions of the Third Schedule of the Banking Ordinance"); see also Law-
rence L.C. Lee, Adoption and Application of a "Soft Law" Banking Supervisoy Framework
Based on the Current Basle Accords to the Chinese Economic Area, 16 WIS. INT'L L.J. 687, 711
(1998) ("In supervising banks, the HKMA follows international practices as recom-
mended by the Basle Accords-for example, the capital adequacy framework and the
minimum standards for supervision of international banking groups.").
139 The International Monetary Fund ("IMF") is an "[o]rganization founded at
Bretton Woods inJuly 1944, and located in Washington, D.C., with the goal of oversee-
ing exchange arrangements and lending foreign currency reserves to members." The
Wharton Sch. of Bus., supra note 21, at 16.
40 John W. Head, Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis: The Role of the IMF and the
United States, 7 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POLY' 70, 80 (1998).
141 Ashish Lall & Ming-Hua Liu, Liberalization of Financial and Capital Markets-
Singapore Is Almost There!, 28 LAW & POL'YINT'L Bus. 619, 645 (1997).
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communist nations to integrate the standards into their new capital
adequacy regulations. Even the somewhat isolated Republic of Ka-
zakhstan, formerly part of the Soviet Union, has recently implemented
the standards.1" The following chart summarizes the implementation
of the Basle Accord around the world:
IMPLEMENTATION OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY STANDARDS'"
Basle United States European Union Non-G-10 Countries
Committee
Total capi- Basle Compulsory, at Tend to adopt the
tal to risk- standards least 8% total Basle 8% standard,
weighted plus a lever- capital to risk- even when it is in-
assets at age ratio of weighted assets appropriate be-
least 8% 4% at a cause of volatility
minimum
When the Basle Accord was assembled in 1988, members of the
"club of giants" likely had no idea that their capital adequacy stan-
dards would become so far-reaching. This is especially remarkable for
standards that were simply a gentlemen's agreement among a small
group of central bankers and never ratified into international law.
Even though the Basle countries "are not legally bound, the Basle Ac-
cords' methodology now applies to virtually all financial institutions
worldwide."1" The Basle methodology has become the international
capital adequacy standard, but it has not become a widely laudable
standard.
E. The Seven Deadly Sins of the 1988 Accord
The current capital adequacy standards contain at least seven ma-
jor flaws. First and most importantly, the Basle Accord establishes a
regime that inaccurately micromanages bank risks categorically. Sec-
'42 See Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, "Law on Banks and
Banking Activity in the Republic of Kazakhstan," art. 42 (adopting the Basle Accord
into the national banking regulation of Kazakhstan). "The [National Bank of the Re-
public of Kazakhstan's] implementation of prudential normative regulations sets forth,
among other things, a minimum capital level substantially in accordance with the Basle
Committee's Accord on Capital Adequacy." Gary A. Gegenheimer, Bank Regulatory Re-
form in the Republic of Kazakstar, 17 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 153, 184-85 (1998).
143 The following chart is replicated from Lee, supra note 37, at 29.
'4 Id. at 6.
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ond, nations still disagree with one another on the definition of "regu-
lated capital." Third, the Basle Committee adopted a capital ratio of
8% without offering any empirical justification for the figure. Fourth,
the Accord presumes that equity serves as an inherently better cushion
than debt. Fifth, capital adequacy standards as designed by the Com-
mittee have not adequately leveled the playing field among nations.
Sixth, the measure of risk-based assets ignores risk reduction caused
by diversification. The final flaw is that the Basle rules are too simplis-
tic and rigid to adequately govern the complex world of banking.
When the Basle Committee members designed the risk-based asset
weightings, they sought to incorporate the reality that banks possessed
assets at varying degrees of credit risk. The Committee's apportion-
ment of all assets into one of four risk categories was rather coarse.145
This method's obvious defect is that loans within the same risk catego-
ries will never exactly possess the same amount of credit risk. For ex-
ample, unsecured loans to businesses are uniformly rated as having a
100% risk. 4 6 "Under the system currently in force, loans to IBM and
to the corner news agent are assigned the same degree of risk.",47
Clearly, the degree of credit risk that each loan represents varies
broadly from business to business. Companies that work to improve
their financial stability, therefore, are not rewarded but instead penal-
ized by the Basle Accord. The identical problem exists in the 0%
category (and in all categories). Although the OECD countries4 are
a diverse group of nations with uneven degrees of economic stability,
loans to OECD national governments are uniformly assessed as pre-
senting no risk of default-'49 Thus, "all OECD sovereign borrowers at-
tract a zero risk weighting, putting countries like Korea on a par with
the US." 5 ' A second component of this defect is that risk weights
among the various categories are often disproportionately inaccurate.
For example, an unsecured loan to the Microsoft Corporation is cur-
rently deemed twice as risky as a family mortgage.' 5' Such a result
145 See supra Part III.C (detailing the current risk-weighted asset categories promul-
gated through the Basle Accord).
'4 See 12 C.F.R § 208 app. A, attachment III (1999) (detailing the types of assets
classified in the 100% risk category).
14 Jules Stewart, Another Reason for Banks To Make Friends of Credit-Worthy, FIN.
DIRECrOR, Sept. 17, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2027705.
' See supra note 118 (listing the member nations of the OECD).
14 See 12 C.F.R. § 208 app. A, attachment III (detailing the types of assets classified
in the 0% risk category).
"0 Basle Reforms Overdue, FIN. NEWS, Oct. 7, 1999, available in 1999 WL 24779976.
151 An unsecured loan to a business would be rated as having a 100% risk. A mort-
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seems rather absurd, but it is currently the law. This first flaw of the
Basle Accord, the inaccurate, categorical assessment of asset risks, has
led to two major problems, the second stemming from the first.
This first flaw of the Basle Accord has encouraged banks to en-
gage in what commentators refer to as "regulatory arbitrage." Arbi-
trage is generally the "simultaneous purchase and sale or lending and
borrowing of two assets or two groups of equivalent assets in order to
profit from a price disparity."52 In a perfectly competitive environ-
ment, if two loans bear the same amount of overall risk, the interest
rates charged on the two loans would be equal. Since capital ade-
quacy regulations require a certain amount of capital to be held as a
cushion against each loan, there is the possibility that two loans of
equal risk could be assessed at different risk levels and thus be placed
in separate categories. Moreover, if the risk weight assigned to one
loan is far below its inherent risk, the bank will replace this asset with
a higher yielding loan requiring the same or less regulatory capital.
Thus, a "bank may engage in costly 'regulatory arbitrage' to effectively
evade the regulatory capital requirement."153 This regulatory arbitrage
is accomplished by "swapping high risk-weight assets for low risk-
weight assets."'5 Therefore, the Basle Accord may have actually pro-
vided incentives for banks to take more risks rather than curb perilous
risk taking.155
This sort of regulatory arbitrage strongly contributed to an inter-
national "credit crunch" in the United States156 and subsequent finan-
gage securing a single-family home is rated at having only a 50% risk of default. See 12
C.F.R. § 208 app. A, attachment III (detailing the types of assets classified in the 100%
and 50% risk categories).
12 The Wharton Sch. of Bus., supra note 21, at 1.
Mingo, supra note 34, at 51.
... Alford, supra note 26, at 216.
"S See RIcHARD DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING DEREGULATION: THE GREAT
BANKING EXPERImENT 170 (1992) ("[B]ecause the riskiness of a bank's assets is no
longer reflected in the cost or availability of its funding, the propensity for risk-taking
by banks has greatly increased."); David Jones &John Mingo, Industry Practices in Credit
Risk Modeling and Internal Capital Allocations: Implications for a Models-Based Regulatory
Capital Standard, ECON. POLY REV. FED. REsERVE BANK N.Y., Oct. 1998, at 53, 54
("[G]apital arbitrage stems from the disparities between true economic risks and the
'one-size-fits-all' notion of risk embodied in the Accord."); Mingo, supra note 34, at 51
("[I]f a bank acts to maintain a chosen insolvency probability, requiring it to hold
more capital may lead the bank to hold riskier assets sufficient to exactly offset the ad-
ditional capital and leave insolvency probability unchanged."); Basle Reforms Overdue,
supra note 150 ("The crude weighting system applied to different types of lending is
often incentivising banks to assume risk. For instance, the rules make it attractive to
lend short-term to other banks.").
156 "As the Basle Accord became final in 1992, a slowdown in bank lending seemed
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cial crises in Asia and Central America. 7 Most Americans are em-
ployed by private enterprises in one form or another. Generally,
when American businesses thrive, the national economy also prospers.
To finance their operations, many businesses incur debt in the form
of bank loans. Since the Basle Accord decreed that business loans
bear a weighted-risk of 100%, banks are deterred from loaning to pri-
vate enterprises because they can loan to central governments by pur-
chasing sovereign debt and hold no capital against such assets.158
Businesses are therefore forced to either pay more for bank loans5 9 or
find alternative means of financing their operations.
[The Basle rules] have forced banks to shift the assets they hold in their
portfolios. In the early 1990s banks reduced their commercial loans and
raised their treasury holdings. This resulted in a corresponding decrease
in the number of borrowers who were able to obtain loans. Large com-
panies are not seriously harmed from this decline in credit because they
have the option of issuing commercial paper. Rather, consumers and
small businesses, that portion of the economy that represents half the
gross domestic product and constitutes the principal source ofjob crea-
tion, suffer. 160
Many government officials conceded that Basle standards had a
negative effect on the business and consumer lending market, further
contributing to the economic downturn.
Richard C. Breeden, then chairman of the SEC, and William Isaac, a
former chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
suggested that the Basle Committee was partially responsible for the re-
cession of the early 1990s. Breeden and Isaac claimed that the commit-
tee's bank capitalization requirements had so restricted credit that "it is
hardly surprising the economy cannot seem to pull itself out of reces-
sion."
61
to be creating or intensifying a recession in the U.S. and other industrial countries."
ScoTr & WELLONS, supra note 8, at 233.
157 See infra text accompanying notes 162-66.
15 See 12 C.F.R. § 208 app. A, attachment III (1999) (detailing the types of assets
classified in the 0% and 100% risk categories); Albrecht & Smith, supra note 21, at 417
("Corporate loans are relatively expensive items, in terms of capital, to hold on a
bank's balance sheet, because they are risk-weighted at one hundred percent, irrespec-
tive of the actual credit quality of the counterparty.").
159 "[T]he Accord encouraged banks to invest in government bonds, with zero risk
weight and therefore no capital cost, rather than lend to commercial and consumer
borrowers subject to as much as 8% capital." SCOTr & WELLONS, supra note 8, at 233;
see also R. Litan, Nightmare in Basl, INT'L EcON., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 7 (discussing how
much more expensive it is for a bank to loan to a company in contrast to purchasing a
government bond under the Basle rules).
'60 Conroy, supra note 14, at 2431-32 (footnotes omitted).
161 Zaring, supra note 6, at 284 (quoting Richard C. Breeden & William N. Isaac,
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Though many initially believed the risk-weighted categories would
heal wounds in the international banking system by providing a more
universal capital cushion, the Accord had the effect of becoming a
tourniquet around the neck of the American economy. The United
States, however, was not the only country to feel the ill effects of this
first major flaw of the Basle Accord.
Some commentators attribute the further agitation of financial ca-
lamities in Asia to the risk-weighted specifications of the Accord. Al-
though the Committee felt that risk weights were the "most workable
proxy"162 for identifying the broad range of risks facing G-10 banks at
the time, no account was taken of differences between the G-10
economies and the other economies that eventually would be pres-
sured into adopting the Accord. As a result of Asian nations' typically
dense populations, Asian real estate markets are different from those
in the United States or Western Europe. Although the Basle Commit-
tee determined the risk rate for real estate mortgages to be 50%, mar-
kets such as Hong Kong mortgages are more than four times as risky
as those in the United States163 "Even a risk factor of 200% may not
be unreasonable. "164 Nevertheless, the lower-than-market risk weights
assigned to mortgages provided incentives for Hong Kong banks and
other Asian banks to make higher-yielding, riskier loans, while re-
maining effectively undercapitalized. The conclusion is that "the col-
lapse of some Hong Kong banks is attributed to their heavy invest-
ment in the high risk and extremely volatile real estate market. " "
The Mexican peso crash was also facilitated by the inaccurate risk-
based categories of the Basle Accord. Since Mexico became an OECD
country, its central government's financial obligations were deter-
mined to be risk-free. Now that banks could make high interest loans
to the Mexican government (by purchasing sovereign debt) without
allocating any corresponding capital to their balance sheets, regula-
tory arbitrage was again encouraged.
Mexico's membership in the OEGD merits particular attention .... The
Basle Accord put a zero weighting on credit risk for the central govern-
ment debt of all OEGD countries, which by mid-1994 included Mexico.
Therefore, at the time of the Mexican peso crash, banks from around
Thank Baslefor the Credit Crunch, WALL ST.J., Nov. 4, 1992, at A14).
162 New Framework, supra note 10, annex 2, 1[ 3.
'0 See Hsu, supra note 138, at 676 ("While the risk weight for residential mortgages
is fifty percent, this level is not suitable in the Hong Kong environment where the real
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the globe could hold Mexican government debt securities without pro-
viding any capital reserves for credit risk.
16
Thus, the risk-weighted categories of the Accord have caused
some of the very imprudent behavior which they were designed to
prevent.
The second flaw of the Basle Accord is its failure to end disagree-
ments among nations regarding the appropriate definition of "regula-
tory capital." Some nations favor rules restricting regulatory capital to
equity instruments, while others prefer including more debt with less
residual attributes in the ambit of regulatory capital.167 The current
classification of capital into Tier 1 and Tier 2 leaves countries some
room to squeeze such preferences into the balance sheets of their re-
spective commercial banks. The Committee's definition of Tier 2 es-
pecially "allows national regulators to include various forms of quasi-
equity in their individual definition of bank capital."
161
The Accord's definition of capital is also overly broad in that it
construes Tier 1 capital as incorporating common stock and
" [q] ualifying non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock. 1 69 Since Tier 1
capital is required to be 4% or more of the bank's risk-weighted assets,
banks of every nation have been attempting to get various equity in-
struments to qualify. For example, although perpetual is a synonym
for eternal, "most banks have structured... offerings. . with a ma-
turity of 20 or 30 years" to fit within the realm of Tier 1.170 Deutsche
166 Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the Neoliberal
Contagion, 7 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 85,106 (1999).
167 Even nations represented on the Basle Committee failed to reach a true consen-
sus on the definition of "regulatory capital":
The Germans regarded the broadening by the [Basle] Committee of any defi-
nition beyond shareholders' equity as undermining the rigor of German capi-
tal requirements. France, which had a number of state-owned banks that
would have found it difficult to increase shareholders' equity, argued for in-
cluding a substantial amount of subordinated debt in the definition. The
United States, which had counted loan loss reserves as part of regulatory capi-
tal, argued that such a practice should be continued. The Japanese, whose
banks had substantial unrealized capital gains in securities holdings, argued
that such gains should be counted as assets and, hence, as higher equity.
Statement No. 160, supra note 11.
16s Alford, supra note 26, at 203.
,69 12 C.FR. § 208 app. A, attachment I (1999) (emphasis added); see also supra
Part III.B (outlining the components of Tier 1 capital).
170 Deutsche Reopens Tier 1 Capital Issue, INT'L BANKiNG REG., Feb. 9, 1998, at 1; see
also Arturo Estrella, Formulas or Superision? Remarks on the Future of Regulatoy Capita
ECON. POL'YREV. FED. RESERVE BANKN.Y., Oct. 1998, at 191, 191 (describing the "risk
of an increasing disconnect between regulatory capital and what banks and other fi-
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Bank, the world's largest bank, made an even more daring attempt in
its recent offering of a new brand of preferred stock that closely re-
sembled a long-term debt instrument.17 1 The stock "has a final matur-
ity of only 10 years, with no call options."'" The German government
seems to approve of the offering, probably because it will give German
banks an advantage over other nations' banks offering more perpetual
equity. While ten years does not seem to fall within the realm of "per-
petual," the Deutsche Bank offering shows how bold bankers are con-
stantly testing the waters of Tier 1. With both commercial banks and
their regulators manipulating Tier I to encompass less residual equity,
one wonders whether the Basle definition of regulatory capital is not
completely vacuous.
A third major criticism of the Basle Accord is that the 8% capital
ratio requirement has little or no grounding. In fact, many nations,
including the United States, have made special provisions to raise the
8% ratio either in specific cases or on a universal basis.'7 The 8% fig-
ure may not be trustworthy because "regulatory measures of 'capital'
may not represent a bank's true capacity to absorb unexpected
losses."' 74 Why should the ratio be 8% and not 6%, or even 10%? Un-
fortunately, the Basle Committee has left the world with little justifica-
tion for its choice. Indeed, "[t]he 8% minimum is not grounded in
any financial model of capital adequacy. Not only has the [Basle]
Committee failed to explain why 8% is the right minimum total capi-
tal ratio, it has never defined the question to which 8% is the an-
swer." 75 This ambiguity has led to a mixed result. Countries have ei-
ther individually mandated a higher ratio or collectively ignored the
current, arbitrary ratio. Moreover, studies conducted with the most
reliable credit risk models have shown that a typical bank may be con-
currently over-capitalized from the regulators' point of view, but in-
adequately capitalized from a market standpoint.76 The first flaw of
nancial institutions do").
'71 See Deutsche Reopens Tier 1 Capital Issue; supra note 170, at 1 (describing the new
equity offering Deutsche Bank hoped to qualify as Tier 1).
172 Id
'73 See 12 C.F.R. § 208 app. A (stating that the Federal Reserve has the ability to in-
crease the capital ratio when it considers such action necessary); Lall & Liu, supra note
141, at 645 (discussing how Singapore adopted the basic standards of Basle, but in-
creased the capital ratio to provide even more of a capital cushion against credit risk).
174 Jones & Mingo, supra note 155, at 53.
17 Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 21.
176 See Mingo, supra note 34, at 51 ("From a regulatory perspective the [hypotheti-
cal] bank is 'well-capitalized;' but from an economic perspective the bank is under-
capitalized by nearly 3 percentage points.").
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the Basle Accord, inaccurate risk categories producing, inter alia,
regulatory arbitrage, further exacerbates this third defect.
77
The fourth flaw of the current capital adequacy regime is its deep-
seated presumption that equity serves as an inherently better cushion
than debt. Equity is thought to serve as a better capital cushion
mainly because debt is intrinsically a liability. Unlike common equity
instruments that represent a perpetual and residual interest in the
bank's assets, debt instruments must eventually be repaid. The result
is that the same long-term debt instrument could serve as a capital
cushion for part of its life and then become a liability as it nears ma-
turity. From this standpoint, debt is a less solid cushion for ensuring
that a bank's capital is adequate to withstand realized credit risk. This
argument, however, may be more academic than pragmatic.
Since capital adequacy regulation aims to encourage bankers to
act with sound judgment75 and not imprudently increase their risks,
debtholders, rather than equity shareholders, may have more incen-
tives to insist that bankers do not issue risky loans. Debtholders re-
ceive only the price of their debt at the time of payment by the bank.
Equity holders, on the other hand, stand to gain wealth through divi-
dends and higher stock prices. If the bank makes risky loans and be-
comes insolvent, both debtholders and shareholders lose. If, however,
the bank successfully obtains higher yields on riskier assets, share-
holders will gain directly from such yields. Debtholders, in contrast,
will gain nothing more than their original entitlement to the face
value of the debt plus accrued interest.179 Therefore, debtholders
have more incentive than equity owners to ensure that commercial
banks act more prudently in their capacity as risk takers.'
The fifth defect in the Basle Accord is that its goal of leveling the
playing field among nations can never be achieved by such a regula-
tory structure.' This unlikelihood results from the immense variance
177 SeeJones & Mingo, supra note 155, at 53 ("The basic problem is that securitiza-
fion and other forms of capital arbitrage allow banks to achieve effective capital re-
quirements well below the nominal 8 percent Basle standard.").
'78 See supra Part I.C (discussing the reasons for capital adequacy regulation by the
government). Regulators have decided that they do not fancy "major banks op-
erat[ing] with such a high default probability." Mingo, supra note 34, at 53.
179 'The temptation shareholders sometimes face to profit at the expense of deb-
tholders by increasing asset risk is known as the 'asset substitution' problem .... "
Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 30 n.18.
"0 See infra Part V.A (discussing the impact of debtholders on capital adequacy
regulation and the basics of the subordinated debt requirement of the Shadow Com-
mittee Proposal).
181 Professor Hal Scott of Harvard Law School has even remarked that "it would be
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of supplementary regulations, customs, and market structures that
continue to position nations on uneven playing fields. Indeed, "the
Basle Accord could not appreciably even the playing field between
United States and foreign banks. Other, more powerful factors are at
work that distort this competition."' One of those more powerful
factors is whether nations maintain insurance systems that bail out in-
solvent banks. Countries that are much more generous in bailing out
commercial banks create greater incentives for banks to take on more
risk.us Since "the strength of safety nets differs among countries," lit-
tie leveling can really be accomplished.'8 Another major divide
among countries is the degree of diversity among financial instru-
ments. Even between the United States and its financially sophisti-
cated peers in Europe, certain types of equity do not coexist on both
continents. For instance, "European banks do not generally issue
non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock."85 Since non-cumulative
perpetual preferred stock can be used to satisfy the Tier 1 regulatory
capital requirements,116 U.S. banks are clearly at a competitive advan-
tage vis-a-vis their European counterparts. 7 Other differences among
nations that are purely market-based, such as comparative advantages
in housing and other industries, can also affect bank lending habits1
tm
These obvious variances between nations are unlikely to change in the
next few years.
an accident if the Accord evened the playing field." Hal S. Scott, The Competitive Impli-
cations of the Basle CapitalAccord, 39 ST. LOuiS U. L.J. 885, 891 (1995)."2 Id. at 886; see also MAXMILIAN J.B. HALL, BANKING REGULATION AND
SUPERVISION: A COMPARATWVE STUDY oF THEUK, USAANDJAPAN 183 (1993) ("Despite
common objectives and the pressures created for convergence in regulatory and su-
pervisory practice, the regulatory and supervisory regimes currently in place in the UK,
USA and Japan are likely to retain a significant degree of distinctiveness for a consid-
erable time to come.").
3 See supra note 38 (mentioning the moral hazard created by deposit insurance
regimes).
184 Scott, supra note 181, at 887.
185 Id. at 892.
19 See 12 C.F.R. § 208 app. A, attachment II (1999) (ascribing "no limit" on the
amount of non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock included in Tier 1).
187 See Scott, supra note 181, at 892 ("Insofar as this results in foreign banks using
more expensive forms of capital, they are at a competitive disadvantage with U.S. banks
which make significant use of such instruments."). TheJapanese also lack the ability to
incorporate certain types of equity into their required regulatory capital. See id.
("Japanese banks have not been able, due to legal impediments, to take advantage of
the Basle rules permitting the use of preferred stock.").
"s See id. at 893 (explaining, for instance, that "there is less financing of residential
real estate inJapan due to different housing conditions").
2000] 1807
1808 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 148:1771
Whatever the outcome of international agreements-multilateral or bi-
lateral-and irrespective of differences in legal and fiscal systems, institu-
tional structure or accounting conventions, national differences in ap-
proach will always exert a powerful influence on the fortunes of
internationally active banks and the stability of the international banking
system because of the degree of discretion which will always reside with
national governments and regulatory authorities.
189
Because there are so many other variables in the equation of equaliza-
tion, the Basle Accord's mere contribution of capital adequacy stan-
dards was too weak to level the playing field-and perhaps may have
made the field more uneven for some.
The sixth major error of the Basle Accord is that it ignores diversi-
fication when calculating the total risk-based assets by which the
amount of qualifying capital is divided. Diversification is the "process
of investing in a number of different assets."190 In practical terms, "di-
versification allows investment in riskier individual securities by reduc-
ing risk exposure to a portfolio by such individual assets. In this way,
higher returns can be pursued without incurring all the risk of a sin-
gle risky asset."191 Instead of using diversification to adjust the total
risk-weighted assets, the current standards simply require that once
assets are individually multiplied by their corresponding categorical
risk, they are collectively summed. Thus, the Basle Accord overlooks
the widely accepted theory of portfolio valuation. Again, the result is
more inaccuracy in the determination of the true risk of bank assets
and activities.
The final flaw in the Basle Accord is that it was narrowly designed
to only address the credit risk generated by bank loans and a few OBS
items. The bread and butter of commercial banking is still loaning to
borrowers from funds generated from the deposits of savers. The re-
cent revolution in financial products, however, has allowed banks to
add more lucrative treats to their plates, especially in the form of de-
'99 HALL, supra note 182, at 183-84.
"o ROBERT C. HIGGINS, ANALYSIS FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 375 (4th ed. 1995).
'9' Phillips & Rechtschaffen, supra note 40, at 1765. "An asset's risk in isolation is
greater than its portfolio risk whenever the asset's cash flows and the portfolio's cash
flows are less than perfectly correlated." HIGGINS, supra note 190, at 317. When this
usual event occurs, "some of the asset's cash flow variability is offset by variability in the
portfolio's cash flows, and the effective risk the investor bears is reduced." Id. at 317-
18; see alsoA. James Meigs, The Financial System, in HANDBOOK OF MODERN FINANCE 1-1,
1-5 (Dennis E. Logue ed., 1984) ("Diversification through financial institutions and
markets permits investors to hold a variety of assets whose prices are not tied to one
another. Therefore, as a matter of random chance, losses on some assets should be
offset to some degree by gains on others.").
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rivatives. "[B]anks continue to shift away from traditional deposit tak-
ing and lending and now derive substantial revenue and profit from
derivatives., 112 Derivatives are odd creatures involving hedging and
speculation. "[A] derivative instrument is a financial contract which
derives its value from an underlying asset, reference rate, or index."
193
The four major types of derivatives are options, forwards, futures, and
194swaps. The most common derivatives held and issued by commer-
cial banks are swaps. "[T]he underlying principle of a swap is the
agreement of each of two parties to provide the other with a series of
cash flows, based on fixed or floating interest rates and in the same or
different currencies." 5 When the Basle Accord was first instituted,
the swap and its kin in the derivative family fell into a general category
of OBS items.
196
The problem with swaps and other derivatives is that other types
bf risks, namely market risk, play a more significant role in asset valua-
tion than credit risk. The Basle Committee grappled with the compli-
cations of derivatives in banking activities for a few years after the Ac-
cord and issued capital adequacy guidelines on the treatment of such
activities.197 The Committee even allowed individual banks to deter-
192 Bruce S. Darringer, Swaps, Banks, and CapitaL An Analysis of Swap Risks and a
Critical Assessment of the Base Accord's Treatment of Swaps, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 259,
260 (1995); see also Lee, supra note 37, at 15 ("Banks are also increasingly using new
financial instruments to diversify their earnings, enhance their profits, aid hedge po-
tential risk.").
'93 Darringer, supra note 192, at 265; see also ScoTr & WELLONS, supra note 8, at
1236 (defining derivatives in the glossary as "[fjinancial instruments whose value is
based on that of another security or its underlying asset"). Derivatives are very impor-
tant instruments because they allow parties with different risk rates and preferences to
hedge against changes brought about by the market. See Darringer, supra note 192, at
265 ("Derivatives are extremely important because they facilitate the ability to transfer
and accept risks, enabling entities to hedge against fluctuations in profits which may be
caused by changes in exchange rates, interest rates, commodity prices, or equity
prices.").
194 See Darringer, supra note 192, at 265.
195 S. Henderson, Swap Credit Risk. A Multi-Perspective Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL
BANKING AND CORPORATE FINANCiAL OPERATIONS 41 (K. Lian et al. eds., 1989); see also
Darringer, supra note 192, at 266 ("A swap is a contract whereby two counterparties
agree to exchange future cash flows at periodic intervals during the life of the swap
according to a prearranged formula.").
'9 See Base Accord, supra note 7, annex 3, at 24 (discussing the treatment of "for-
eign exchange and interest rate related items," including swaps, as off-balance-sheet
assets).
197 See Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks, Jan., 1996,
at 1-8 (amending the 1988 Accord to include capital cushions for market risk, brought
mainly by derivatives activities); see also Matthews, supra note 79, at 167-70 (discussing
the treatment of derivative holdings by banks under the current Basle Accord). The
20001 1809
1810 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 148:1771
mine market and other risks associated with derivatives by using inter-
nal credit risk models. 19 Thus, the Committee's large degree of def-
erence to commercial banks clearly evidences the shortcomings of the
Accord's ability to cope with financial products that are now a larger
portion of the business of banking. Moreover, as one commentator
has noted, "[m]any current securitization structures were not con-
templated when the Accord was drafted, and cannot be addressed ef-
fectively within the current [Basle] framework."1"
In summary, the Basle Accord, originally a divine miracle of legal
process, has become a problem child of regulatory conformity. The
Basle Accord commits seven deadly sins, all of which detract from the
twin goals of establishing accurate cushions against bank credit risks
and leveling the playing field among participating nations. The Ac-
cord's seven problems-its inaccurate, micromanaging of bank risks
categorically; its failure to finally establish a comprehensive definition
of regulatory capital; its desultory adoption of the 8% capital ratio; its
presumption that equity serves as an inherently better cushion than
debt; its presumption that capital standards alone could level the in-
ternational playing field; its ignorance of risk reduction engendered
by diversification; and its inability to effectively regulate complex fi-
nancial instruments and transactions that are becoming more preva-
lent in banking-have made the materialization of the Committee's
aspirations all the more impossible. The Committee's failure to pro-
vide capital adequacy standards that ensure a stable and efficient in-
ternational banking system results from its violation of a cardinal eco-
nomic principle: "The art of economics consists in looking not merely
at the immediate but at the longer effects of any act or policy; it con-
sists in tracing the consequences of that policy not merely for one
group but for all groups.""' The Basle Committee, in its effort to hast-
ily manufacture a set of capital adequacy rules, failed to contemplate
both the short- and long-term results of applying such rigid rules.
fifth flaw of the Accord, its ignorance to diversification, has combined with this last
flaw to increase the inaccuracy of derivative risk calculations. "Basle fails to take ac-
count of whether a bank's swap portfolio is diversified across various counterparties
and industries." Darringer, supra note 192, at 311-12.
"s SeeDarringer, supra note 192, at 301-11 (discussing the Committee's approval of
banks determining credit risk through models).
1 Jones & Mingo, supra note 155, at 59.
20' HENRY HAzLrrt, EcoNoMIcs IN ONE LESSON 17 (3d ed. 1979) (emphasis omit-
ted).
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IV. THE 1999 BASLE COMMITrEE PROPOSAL
By 1999, more than one hundred nations had implemented the
2011capital adequacy standards designed by the Basle Committee. Since
the Accord is wrought with flaws, countries around the world have felt
the ill effects of their newly adopted capital standards. After more
than a decade of inaccurate capital ratios leading to regulatory arbi-
trage and the international credit crunch, regulatory bodies and
bankers from nearly all participating nations lost their tolerance for
the 1988 Accord and petitioned for change.
Their petition forced the Basle Committee to acknowledge the
weaknesses of the original Accord and subsequent Concordats.212 The
Committee admitted that the "current risk weighting of assets results,
at best, in a crude measure of economic risk," which has enabled
"banks to arbitrage their regulatory capital requirement and exploit
divergences between true economic risk and risk measured under the
Accord."213 In June 1999, the Basle Committee issued A New Capital
Adequacy Framework, a major consultative paper, which will serve as the
basis for a new Basle Capital Accord in late 2000 or 2001.
The Basle Committee stated four objectives of the new Accord:
(1) improving "safety and soundness in the financial system," (2)
promoting "competitive equality," (3) establishing "a more compre-
hensive approach to addressing risks," and (4) making the require-
ments "suitable for application to banks of varying levels of complexity
and sophistication."204 To achieve these goals, the Committee divided
its proposed reforms into "three pillars: minimum capital requirements; a
supervisory review of capital adequacy; and market discipline.'2 5 To some
degree, these three pillars of regulatory reform will partially eliminate
some of the problems of the 1988 Accord by improving the accuracy
of the risk weights and encouraging banks to improve their own in-
ternal standards for allocating capital against risk. The New Framework,
however, is not without its own flaws. Unfortunately, the proposal re-
tains some of the defects of the original Accord and even introduces
some new problems as well. An outline of the new proposal follows.
201 See New Framework, supra note 10, 1 44 ("Over 100 countries have adopted the
Accord....").




211 &J[2 (emphasis added).
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A. Minimum Capital Requirements
The Committee has again decided to set minimum capital re-
quirements for all commercial banks that will serve as a baseline capi-
tal buffer against losses realized from the actualization of credit and
accompanying risks. In doing so, the Committee will maintain the
original definition of regulatory capital "as set out in the 1988 Ac-
cord. ", °6 Each bank will still be required to maintain 8% of its qualify-
ing regulatory capital against its total of risk-weighted assets. There-
fore, the rudimentary equation establishing minimum capital
requirements will remain the same under this proposal.2 17 "A bank's
risk-based capital ratio will continue to be calculated by dividing its
qualifying capital (the numerator of the ratio) by its weighted-risk as-
sets (the denominator)."1 All banks would continue to evaluate how
much of their capital qualifies as Tier 1 and Tier 2 holdings, not allow-




Consequently, the calculation of the denominator, not the numerator
of the capital ratio, will change if the proposal is adopted as the new
Accord.
In determining the amount of risk-weighted assets to which at
least 8% of a bank's capital will be apportioned, the Basle Committee
has decided to eliminate most of the rigid categorical structure of the
1988 Accord in favor of a more dynamic and accurate assessment of
210each asset's risk. Weights will continue to be expressed in the whole
percentages of 0%, 20%, 50%, and 100%.211 The most risky assets
would be assessed as having a risk weight of 150%.22 In determining
which assets fall into the various risk categories, the Basle Committee
no longer deems certain loans as falling unequivocally within a certain
risk weight. A bank's claim on an unsecured corporate loan would
20 Id. 20; see also id, annex 2, 1 ("The Committee does not propose at this stage
to make further amendments to the definition of capital.").
217 See supra text accompanying note 109 (discussing the required capital ratio
banks must maintain under the terms of the Basle Accord).
21 12 C.F.R. § 208 app. A (1999).
219 See id. attachment II (discussing the limitations on Tiers 1 and 2 of qualifying
regulatory capital).
210 See New Framework, supra note 10, 23 (discussing how "the Committee is pro-
posing revisions to the existing approach to credit risk" in the new proposal).
211 See id. annex 2, 6 (explaining what the various risk-weights signify).
212 See id. ("Claims on countries rated below B- would be weighted at 150%."); see
also id. annex 2, 1 23 (describing why the Committee is proposing to add higher risk
categories for specific assets with a "relatively adverse default history and high price
volatility").
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not automatically require a 100% risk weighting, as it presently does.
To rate the risks involved with various assets, the Basle Committee may
permit two distinct approaches: the Standardised Approach and the
213Internal Ratings-Based Approach.
1. The Standardised Approach
The Standardised Approach will be used "for calculating capital
charges at the majority of banks."214 Some sophisticated banks have
developed internal rating systems to rate the quality of their largest
215borrowers. From these internal ratings, banks can more accurately
assess the risk involved in loans to such borrowers. Since most banks,
however, do not rely on internal ratings, they must rely on either a
regulatory benchmark or an outside party to assess the risk of each
loan. Currently, these banks simply determine into which risk-weight
category the asset falls and then multiply the asset by the percentage
predetermined by the Basle Committee. Instead of the predefined
risk categories of the 1988 Accord, the Committee has proposed the
"use of external credit assessments," most commonly in the form of
rating agencies. 216 Thus, rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's
would rate the borrower's financial stability and ability to satisfy its ob-
ligations. The commercial bank could then use this rating to bench-
mark the risk of the loan made to that entity and then convert it to a
217risk percentage.
To explain the difference between the new proposal and the cur-
rent Accord, it is helpful to use a hypothetical. Suppose Bank A lent
the Microsoft Corporation $1,000,000,000 (without taking a security
interest in collateral) to be repaid in ten years. Under the current
capital adequacy rules, the risk weight of the loan would be assessed at
100%,218 meaning that a full $80,000,000 in qualifying regulatory capi-
2'3 See id. 1 23, 25 (providing summaries of the standardised approach and the
internal ratings-based approach).
214 Id. [ 23.
21' See infra text accompanying notes 245-47 (describing the alternative internal
ratings-based approach, which allows certain banks to be exempted from relying on
external credit agencies if they maintain an internal system for assessing the financial
risks of borrowers).
216 New Framework supra note 10, 23.
217 See id annex 2, 18 (explaining the new, proposed weighting methodology).
218 See 12 C.F.R. § 208 app. A, attachment M (1999) (requiring that "[a]ll other
claims by private obligors" including commercial loans, be assessed at 100%); Stewart,
supra note 147 ("At present, if an AA-rated corporate and another rated BBB have ten-
year facilities with a given bank, they both require the same capital usage.").
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tal would be required as a cushion against the loan's risk of default-2,9
Under the new proposal, the end result may be different depending
on the rating of Microsoft as assessed by an external credit rating
agency. If Standard & Poor's rates Microsoft as "AAA,' O° the com-
pany's highest quality rating, then the new proposal would provide for
a corresponding risk weight of 20%. The amount of qualifying capital
required to serve as a cushion against the loan would only be
$1 6 ,000,0 00.221 Therefore, the new proposal would taper Bank A's
capital requirement by $64 million for the same $1,000,000,000 loan
to Microsoft. If the rating agencies' assessments are accurate, the new
proposal will lead to a more precise weighing of risk and a decrease in
regulatory arbitrage. Moreover, implementation of the New Framework
could provide opportunities for the most solvent companies to borrow
at lower interest rates since up to 80% of the risk-weights may be re-
duced on their loans.
For claims against central governments (sovereigns), the Basle
Committee has proposed abandoning the current rule that allocates
no risk to loans made to OECD central governments. Instead, the
Committee would allow the ratings of external agencies to correspond
to a sliding scale of risk weights ranging from 0% to 150%.u Thus, if
the U.S. government were rated as a AAA borrower by Standard &
Poor's or another external rating agency,us a long-term treasury bond
would receive a risk-weighting of zero, thus requiring no capital cush-
ion. On the other hand, if a commercial bank had a loan outstanding
2'9 The $80 million capital requirement derives from multiplying the value of the
Microsoft loan by its corresponding risk weight and the required capital ratio of the
Accord. Thus, $80,000,000 = $1,000,000,000 x 100% x 8%.
2" See New Framework, supra note 10, annex 2, 1 5 (discussing the various risk
weights that correspond to the external credit ratings of private rating agencies).
221 $16,000,000 = $1,000,000,000 x 20% x 8%.
22 See New Framework, supra note 10, annex 2, 4 (discussing the application of dif-
ferent risk weights corresponding to the "assessment results of eligible external credit
assessment institutions").
Although rating agencies differ somewhat in their designations of good and bad
ratings, the ratings used by the most popular agencies are similar:
Credit Assessment Very High Quality Very Low Quality
Institution Assessment Assessment
Fitch IBCA AA- and above Below B-
Moody's Aa and above Below B3
Standard & Poor's AA- and above Below B-
Export insurance 1 7
agencies
Id. annex 2, 1 32, Table 2 (footnotes omitted).
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to a country rated at the very bottom of the scale (e.g., Haiti, rated be-
low B-), the dollar amount of the loan would be assessed at 150%.
The effect of this rating would be the bank holding twelve cents of
qualified regulatory capital for every dollar of the loan.24 The pro-
posal to change the current flat zero risk rate for OECD countries was
a direct response to problems that arose when banks began loaning
excessive amounts to countries whose repayment ability was question-
able.us The Committee admitted that the current standards are inac-
curate since "some countries that [did] not merit inclusion on
grounds strictly related to default risk would be included in the pref-
erential group, while potentially high credit quality countries outside
the OECD [were] excluded." 6
The Committee also proposes using the ratings of external agen-
cies to assess the risk of long-term claims on banks.22 7 In obtaining the
credit risk percentage for each bank, the Committee proposes two op-
tions. The first is "revis[ing] the Accord so that claims on banks
would be given risk weights based on the weighting applied to claims
on the sovereign in which the bank is incorporated."228 Since private
banks normally are not as solvent as central governments, the bank
would receive the next highest risk weight attributable to its govern-
ment.2 For instance, if Canada as a sovereign received a 0% credit
risk weight from an external rating agency, an unrated Canadian
commercial bank would receive a 20% risk rating.
The second option proposed by the Committee provides for the
risk weighting of bank debt on the basis of the individual bank's as-
sessment by a rating agency.2 0 This option would compensate finan-
cially strong banks based in weak nations. Under this scheme, a par-
2' If the risk rate is 100%, a full 8% of qualified regulatory capital must serve as a
cushion. This requirement means that the bank must set aside eight cents of capital
for every dollar loaned. If the risk rate is 150%, the bank must hold 1.5 times the capi-
tal ratio. In effect, this changes the required capital ratio for the full dollar amount of
the asset to 12%. Thus, for every dollar of the claim assessed at 150%, the bank must
set aside a corresponding 12 cents of regulatory capital.
See supra text accompanying note 166 (discussing the financial conundrum of
allocating zero risk to Mexico, which had recentlyjoined the OECD).
226 See New Framework; supra note 10, annex 2,1[ 3.
22 See id. annex 2, Ift 11-12 (discussing the current proposal's treatment of
"[c]laims on banks").
Id. annex 2, 111.
See id. ("The weight applied to the bank would be one category less favourable
than that applied to the country.").
m See id. annex 2, 1 12 ("The second option would be to use ratings assigned di-
rectly to banks by an external credit assessment institution.").
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ticularly strong bank could receive the same weight as its central gov-
ernment, provided that weight was not 0%. Again, a bank could not
be assigned a risk weight that was lower than its national government
and no bank debt could receive a risk weight of less than 20%.21 The
Committee also proposes that claims on securities firms "should gen-
erally be weighted in the same way as claims on banks.",
2
In addition, the Committee proposes that claims on corporations
be subject to the assessment of external rating agencies. The pro-
posed degree of diversity in corporate ratings is, however, severely lim-
ited. The Committee suggests the assignment of a lower risk percent-
age than the current mandatory weight of 100% for only the highest
caliber corporations, as designated by external rating agencies.2 3 The
proposal would also allow a risk weighting of 150% for claims on the
poorest rated corporations. 4 Claims on corporate loans are also sub-
ject to the general rule that disallows the assignment of "a risk weight
preferential to the risk weighting assigned to a claim on the sovereign
of the corporat[ion] 's country of incorporation. '5
The effect of these somewhat confusing rules is the establishment
of three possible risk weights for corporate claims. First, the lowest
quality claims will receive a 150% risk weight. Second, the claims on
the highest rated corporations (i.e., AAA) will receive a 20% risk
weight. Third, the Committee proposes to assign every other corpo-
rate claim a 100% risk weight, whether it is rated above or below aver-
age. The Committee's proposal will thus preserve the status quo,
since a majority of these claims will be weighted at 100%, the same
percentage assigned under the current regime.
231 See id.
232 Id. annex 2, 16.
2" See id. annex 2, J[ 18 (proposing to allow only "claims on corporates of a very
high quality" to be afforded a lower risk weight).
See id. (noting "that a weighting of 150% [should] be given to claims on corpo-
rates which are of very low quality").
25 Id.
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SUMMARY OF THE STANDARDISED APPROACHB
s
Claim Assessment
AAA A+ BBB+ BB+ Below Unrated
toAA- toA- toBBB- toB- B-
Sovereigns 0% 20% 50% 100% 150% 100%
Banks Option 11 20% 50% 100% 100% 150% 100%
Option 22 20% 50%3 50% 100%3 150% 50%
Corporates 20% 100% 100% 100% 150% 100%
' Risk weighting based on risk weighting of the sovereign in which the
bank is incorporated.
2 Risk weighting based on the assessment of the individual bank.
3 Claims on banks of a short original maturity, for example less than
six months, would receive a weighting that is one category more fa-
vourable than the usual risk weight on the bank's claims.
The Basle Committee intends to retain the other risk weights es-
tablished by the current regime. Mortgages for residential properties
will continue to receive a 50% risk weight.237 The credit conversion
factors currently in force for off-balance sheet itemsm will also remain
in place if the New Framework replaces the 1988 Accord. 9 In its de-
scription of the standardised approach, the Committee acknowledged
that maturity of the claims is also a relevant factor in determining the
asset's credit risk.240 However, "the Committee at present is not pro-
'' See id. annex 2, 1 20, tbl. 1.
2 See i& annex 2, 1 21 (stating that "lending fully secured by mortgages on resi-
dential property... should continue to be weighted at 50%").
2" See 12 C.F.1. pt. 208 app. A, attachment IV (1999) (delineating the credit con-
version factors currently in force in the United States).
2" See New Framework, supra note 10, annex 2, 25 ("The Committee is not propos-
ing to change the existing conversion factors for off-balance-sheet items ... ."). Com-
mitments, which will not remain the same if the new proposal is adopted comprise the
one small exception. "Given that even short-term commitments entail some risk, the
Committee is proposing a credit conversion factor of 20%, which would principally
apply to business commitments." Id. annex 2, 1 26.
20 See id. annex 2, 1 28 (acknowledging that when "the credit quality of two bor-
rowers is equivalent, the exposure to the borrower with the longer-term claim would
generally be riskier than that to the borrower with the shorter-term claim").
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posing to take maturity of claims into account for capital purposes.
2 4
1
For those assets whose risk weights would be altered by external credit
ratings, the Committee suggested that bank regulators examine the
following factors in assessing whether a credit rating agency can prop-
erly rate entities: (1) objectivity, (2) independence, (3) transparency,
(4) credibility, (5) international access, (6) resources, and (7) recog-
242nition. In addition to requiring national regulators to approve a
bank's use of individual ratings, the Committee would require banks
"to disclose the credit assessment institutions that they use for the risk
weighting of their assets, including the percentage of their assets' risk
weightings based on assessments by each such institution. "2'2 This re-
quirement will ensure that banks will not use sub-par rating agencies
with differing appraisals to commit credit-rating arbitrage.44
2. The Internal Ratings-Based Approach
Although most banks would use the standardised approach if the
New Framework is adopted, some banks would use the internal ratings-
based approach. This approach is reserved for "sophisticated banks"
that already use internal systems for evaluating "the risk of individual
credit exposures."2 4 Banks that possess an internal process of assess-
ing the economic risks of borrowers would therefore be exempted
from relying on external credit agencies. Before receiving such an
exemption from the standardised approach, individual banks would
need to obtain approval from regulatory authorities.2 46 The Commit-
tee concedes that the possibility of increased popularity of the internal
ratings-based approach could push the now nearly uniform capital
241 Id.
242 See id. annex 2, 29 (listing the minimum criteria suggested by the Committee).
245 Id. annex 2, 132.
244 External credit assessments can result in credit-rating arbitrage as well. For ex-
ample, if Standard and Poor's were to rate a corporate claim as the very highest qual-
ity, the corresponding risk weight under the proposal would be 20%. If other external
agencies, such as Moody's and Fitch IBCA, were to rate the corporate claim at anything
lower than the very highest appraisal, the corresponding risk weight under the pro-
posa would be 100%. Therefore, the bank would clearly have an incentive to choose
the S & P rating since it requires 80% less regulatory capital per dollar of the claim.
The Committee wants to prevent this form of regulatory arbitrage. "Banks must adopt
a consistent approach in using a particular assessment mechanism and should not
'cherry pick' among assessments." Id. annex 2, 1 2.
24 Id. annex 2, 1 42.
216 See id. annex 2, 146 (stating that "prior supervisory approval would be necessary
before banks could be allowed to use their internal ratings systems for setting mini-
mum capital requirements").
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adequacy regime back to square one. "The lack of homogeneity
among the rating systems at different banks, together with the central
role of subjective risk factors and business judgments in assigning in-
ternal grades, means that comparability across institutions and coun-
tries presents an important hurdle."247 Nevertheless, the internal rat-
ings-based approach has its virtues.
The Basle Committee has stated that its "longer-term aim is to de-
velop a flexible framework that reflects more accurately the risks to
which banks are exposed."248 The current risk-based categories are
only rough approximations of risk and are highly inflexible. The
standardised approach increases the accuracy and flexibility of the as-
signment of risk weights through the use of external rating agencies.
Therefore, the next logical step toward accuracy and flexibility is the
internal ratings-based approach. By allowing each bank to weigh the
risks of its assets by using the same internal methods that are already
commonly used for "loan approval requirements" and "analysis of
pricing and profitability," this approach fulfills the Committee's flexi-
bility objective.2 9
The internal ratings-based approach also may improve the accu-
racy of risk weights. First, because the bank deals directly with cus-
tomers whose claims it will rate, the rating "may incorporate supple-
mentary customer information which is usually out of the reach of an
external credit assessment institution, such as detailed monitoring of
the customers' accounts and greater knowledge of any guarantees or
collateral."2 ° Greater availability of borrower information facilitates
more precise ratings by an objective party. Since the lender usually
has more data on the borrower than a third party, it follows that the
lender will be in a better position to render an accurate rating.
Second, the standardised approach only varies the degree to
which sovereigns, large banks, and corporations are weighted. The
assessment of smaller borrowers may fall outside of the profitable am-
bit of external rating agencies. If this occurs, claims on those borrow-
ers would receive the default risk weightings of the current Basle Ac-
cord. Unrated corporate borrowers, no matter how solvent, would
receive a 100% risk weight.21 Banks using internal systems usually rate
2147 Id annex 2,1 45.
243 I 112.
241 I& annex 2,1[ 42.
Id. annex 2, 43.
" See SUMMARY OF THE STANDARISED APPROACH, supra text accompanying
notes 236-44 (discussing risk weighting in the standardised approach).
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all borrowers in some manner. Thus, where external agencies fail to
rate, internal systems often furnish "assessments of the credit quality
of individuals and small-to-medium sized companies through credit
scoring, and assessment of larger non-rated borrowers through de-
tailed analysis."2  In terms of assigning risk weights to the bank's in-
ternal ratings, the Basle Committee will decide either to link "internal
rating categories to the standardised risk weights" or to "design a capi-
tal charge which explicitly reflects internal ratings.2 3 No matter how
the final details are settled, the Committee feels that the internal rat-
ings-based approach will become the standard for ensuring accuracy
and flexibility in the risk weighting of claims.24
3. The Road Ahead: Credit Risk Models
Credit risk models are internal systems currently used by sophisti-
cated banks to determine their actual capital requirements. These
models are "designed to predict the probability of default and the
likely recovery of assets after a default."2 5 If banks voluntarily main-
tain more capital than the minimum Basle standard, it is most likely
because their internal credit risk models have guided the decision.
Unlike internal ratings, which simply assess the credit worthiness of a
specific borrower, credit risk modeling supplants the entire regulatory
capital adequacy process by: (1) determining an individual bank's
target default risk, (2) estimating the risk of its entire portfolio and
activities for a specific period, and (3) allocating sufficient capital to
ensure a cushion up to the target default risk.
In completing step one, "the target insolvency rate is usually cho-
sen to be consistent with the bank's desired credit rating. "' When a
bank determines the total risk of its assets and OBS items, its mathe-
matical model produces a "probability density function (PDF) for
credit losses." 7 These two variables, the target default risk and the
252 New Framework, supra note 10, annex 2, 1 43.
25 Id. annex 2, 1 39.
24 See id. annex 2, 45 ("[I]nternal ratings... would represent a major step for-
ward for supervisors from the proposed standardised approach.").
25 ScoTr & WELLONs, supra note 8, at 245.
26 Jones & Mingo, supra note 155, at 54.
Id. "When estimating the PDF for credit losses, banks generally employ what we
term either 'top-down' or 'bottom-up' methods." Id. The "top-down" method relies
on "the volatility of charge-offs historically for the type of loan rather than for individ-
ual loans." ScoTr & WELLONS, supra note 8, at 246. Thus, for small loans to individu-
als and entities, the top-down approach is likely to be the most efficient. The "bottom-
up" method involves the assessment of each asset credit risk "based on an explicit
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comprehensive asset risk, are then evaluated by "a consistent 'capital
allocation rule'... to determine the amount of capital that should be
held internally."m Therefore, an individual bank's determination of
its own capital needs is simply that amount of capital exceeding pro-
jected losses at the target insolvency level.O This internal process of
determining capital adequacy could eventually supersede the entire
structure of the current regulatory regime.
Although the Basle Committee specifically stated that it will retain
both the current definition of regulatory capital and the 8% ratio for
the next Accord,260 it has noted explicitly that credit risk models may
be looming on the road ahead. The Committee acknowledged that
"credit risk modelling may prove to result in better internal risk man-
agement, and may have the potential to be used in the supervision of
banks."261 As banks move from the standardised approach to the in-
ternal-ratings based approach (assuming the proposal is adopted),
they become less dependent on the Committee's guidelines for weigh-
ing the risks of assets. The next logical phase is for banks to allocate
their own internally-generated target amount of capital, rather than
rely on the Basle Committee's rigid capital ratio. Credit risk modeling
is conceivably the final step toward the Committee's "longer-term
aim" of providing flexibility and accuracy to the process of ensuring
that bank capital adequately guards against economic risk.2 2 The
Committee "intends to monitor developments in this area closely, and
hopes to engage the industry in a constructive dialogue."2u
B. Supervisory Review of CapitalAdequacy
The second pillar of the New Framework is increasing regulatory
supervision of banks in their implementation of the first pillar, mini-
mal capital standards. The Committee states that regulatory authori-
ties have the twin goals of ensuring "that the [bank's capital] position
is consistent with its overall risk profile and strategy" and intervening
credit evaluation of the underlying customer." Jones &Mingo, supra note 155, at 55.
Mingo, supra note 34, at 50.
29 SeeJones & Mingo, supra note 155, at 54 (explaining that "required economic
capital is the amount of equity over and above expected losses necessary to achieve the
target insolvency rate").
2' See New Framework, supra note 10, 1 20; see also id. annex 2, 1 1 ("The Committee
does not propose at this stage to make further amendments to the definition of capi-
tal.").
26 Id annex 2, 152.
26 Id.1& 12.
26 Id. annex 2, 1 53.
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promptly "if the capital does not provide a sufficient buffer against
risk."6 To achieve these twin aims, the Basle Committee is urging na-
tional bank regulators to increase both manpower and financial acu-265
men. The proposal also encourages regulators to go beyond the
simple audit of ledgers and to examine each bank's fundamental
strategy in assessing its required capital. Regulators are called upon to
evaluate such factors as the "bank's risk appetite," the "markets in
which the bank operates," and the "diversification of its activities.'
Finally, the Committee mandates that regulatory agencies coordinate
their activities when assessing banks operating across national bor-
ders.267
C. Market Discipline
The third pillar of the 1999 proposal is market discipline. The
Committee wants market participants to reward or punish banks for
high capital standards, or a lack thereof, instead of having banks an-
swer solely to regulatory authorities for maintaining adequate capital
standards. After all, a "bank that is perceived as safe and well-
managed in the marketplace is likely to obtain more favourable terms
and conditions in its relations with investors, creditors, depositors and
other counterparties than a bank that is perceived as more risky."26
Enhanced public perception will stem from increased disclosure re-
quirements for banks. The New Framework requires banks, swiftly and
openly, to "disclose all key features of the capital held as a cushion
against losses, and the risk exposures that may give rise to such
losses."269 Although increased disclosure certainly will provide some
incentives for banks to maintain adequate capital, the Committee
2' Id. 32.
261 See id. 36 (encouraging regulatory agencies to examine closely "the number
and skill level of supervisory staff required to carry out this work").
26 Id. 34.
2 See id. 36 (requiring "bank supervisors to work in close co-operation to evalu-
ate the risk profile of internationally active banks and to ensure consistency of stan-
dards across national borders").
268 Id. 1 39.
260 Id. 41. "This information should, at a minimum, be provided in annual finan-
cial reports and should include quantitative and qualitative details on the bank's finan-
cial condition and performance, business activities, risk profile, and risk management
activities." Id.; see also Basle Comm. on Banking Supervision, Enhancing Bank Transpar-
ency (Sept. 1998) <http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm> (discussing ways to optimize
disclosure to ensure banking supervision and market discipline).
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concedes that the disciplining effect of the market will dissipate in
countries with comprehensive deposit insurance regimes.270
D. The Basle Committee's SuperficialAct of Contrition
During the last decade, many bankers, lawyers and regulators have
waited with great hope for a second comprehensive meeting of the
Basle Committee. They hoped that the Committee would atone for
the sins it committed in the 1988 Accord by eliminating many of the
defects of the current regulations. 271 The issuance of the New Frame-
work is evidence that the Basle Committee's vowed rectification of the
flaws of the earlier Accord is more superficial than substantive. The
proposal addresses only one or two of the 1988 Accord's seven deadly
sins. Even with those addressed, the proposal's ameliorative effect will
be limited. There is also the possibility that the new proposal could
present even more dilemmas because of its reliance on external rating
agencies and its plan to move eventually toward internal credit risk
models.
The first and most serious flaw of the 1988 Accord is its inaccurate
categorization of risks by asset type.2n The new proposal seeks to im-
prove the accuracy of risk weights in both the standardised and inter-
nal ratings-based approaches. The current proposal retains the four
rigid categories of risk weights (0%, 20%, 50%, and 100%) and even
adds a new one (150%).27 No matter what the perceived risk of de-
fault for an individual asset, the risk weight assigned must be one of
the five aforementioned percentages, and not, for example, 35% or
75%, even if such percentages are more precise measures of risk. As274
for the link between the fixed risk weights and the type of assets, the
Committee eliminates classification by category by allowing external
27 See New Framework, supra note 10, [ 40 (admitting that "a bank may not be sub-
ject to market discipline from a fully insured depositor who has nothing at risk, and
therefore no motive to impose discipline").
271 See Statement No. 160, supra note 11 (discussing the universal "sense of urgency
for [the Basle Committee to reform its] international capital standards").
2 See supra text accompanying notes 145-66 (discussing the first "sin" of the Ac-
cord).
n See supra table accompanying note 236 (discussing the various risk weights and
their retention as whole percentages); supra text accompanying notes 211-12 (same).
2 This is certainly true for the majority of regulated banks, which will follow the
standardised approach. For the internal ratings-based approach, the Basle Committee
has not yet made a definitive determination of the risk weights it will institute corre-
sponding to internal ratings. It has suggested, however, that "banks could map their
internal rating categories to the standardised risk weights." New Framework supra note
10, annex 2, 1 39.
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rating agencies and internal ratings systems to evaluate assets indi-
vidually before assigning them a risk weight For the standarised ap-
proach, which will become the governing framework for the majority
of banks if the new Accord is established, the Committee has aban-
doned fixed categories for claims on sovereigns, banks, and corpora-
tions by delegating most of the task to external agencies. 75 The rat-
ings are then converted to corresponding risk rates. The result is that
banks are able to allocate differing amounts of capital to two assets of
the same type that pose different degrees of credit risk. For example,
if external agencies assign an average or poor rating to Mexico as a
sovereign, bond holdings issued by the Mexican central government
may not receive an exemption from the regulatory capital require-
ment, as do claims on the U.S. government.276 Consequently, the in-
centive to purchase high yielding Mexican debts instead of lower
yielding U.S. treasury instruments will decrease. Loan incentives for
riskier corporations, as opposed to the most solvent corporations, will
also decline under the proposal, because both claims will no longer
automatically be assigned a 100% risk weight. Provided that banks are
earnest, the internal ratings-based approach will produce the same ef-
fect. Thus, the new proposal will abate some degree of "regulatory
arbitrage" currently motivated by the 1988 Accord. Many believe the
assessment of individual assets through external and internal ratings
of borrowers "would provide a more efficient means of maintaining
bank safety than imposing imprecise blanket capital requirements."
2 7
Although the proposal appears to make "sweeping changes" to the
current regime, the actual modification of risk weights per asset is
largely illusory.
The trouble with the new proposal's treatment of risk weights, es-
pecially under the standardised approach, is twofold. First, the exter-
27 See New Framework, supra note 10, annex 2, 1 2-20 (same); supra Part IV.A.1
(discussing the new risk-weighting procedures for sovereigns, banks, and corporates
under the standardised approach).
26 Since Mexico and the United States are OECD countries, the Accord currently
assigns a 0% risk weight to all claims on them. See Basle Accord, supra note 7, 36 (not-
ing that "claims on central governments within the OECD will attract a zero weight");
12 C.F.R. § 208 app. A, attachment III (1999) (summarizing risk weights). This effec-
tively means that no regulatory capital must be held against these assets. If Mexico is
assigned a risk weight higher than zero, claims on the Mexican central government will
require a cushion of regulatory capital.
Conroy, supra note 14, at 2443; see also Jones & Mingo, supra note 155, at 59
(stating that "in contrast to the one-size-fits-all Basle standard, a bank's internal capital
allocation against a fully funded, unsecured commercial loan will generally vary with
the loan's internal credit rating").
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nal rating agencies can only affect the risk weights of claims of sover-
eigns, banks, and corporations.278 Even the effect of external ratings
on these claims is severely limited. One limitation is that banks and
corporations are capped at a 20% risk rate.! Another limitation is
that these private entities are prohibited from acquiring a lower risk
weight than the central governments of their respective home coun-
280tries. Moreover, the risk weight on claims on some banks would be
directly linked to the risk weights of their sovereigns. Less precise risk
weights result because "not all institutions in a given country present
equal risk. You can have a good bank in a bad country and a bad
bank in a good country ... ."28 ' Less precision in risk weights will in-
evitably lead to capital-requirement arbitrage. The partitioning of
claims on corporations into what seems to be "haves" and "have-nots"
is also a particularly disturbing limitation. Only corporations receiv-
ing the very highest rating will be eligible for the 20% risk weight,
while banks must assign all others at least a 100% risk weight.2 2 Thus,
a corporation with an A+ rating from Standard and Poor's would re-
283ceive the same risk weight as a corporation with a B- rating. Again,
the incentive for regulatory arbitrage is present. Since most corpora-
tions would receive the same 100% risk weight as they did under the
1988 Accord, the prospects for preventing another international
credit crunch are poor.
The other major problem with the proposal's treatment of risk
weighting is that the current risk weights are likely to remain the
See supra table accompanying note 236 (summarizing the standardised ap-
proach).
2 See New Framework, supra note 10, annex 2, 112, 18 (discussing the lowest risk
weights that banks and corporations are eligible to receive). The Shadow Committee
surmises that "[t]he disparity presumably reflects an attempt to enlist support for the
proposed system from countries where most firms are not rated but is unlikely to rep-
resent the true credit quality of many unrated borrowers." Statement No. 160, supra
note 11.
m See New Framework, supra note 10, annex 2, 12 ( "[N]o claim on a bank could
receive a risk weight less than that applied to claims on its sovereign."); id. annex 2, 1
13 ("No claim on a corporate could be given a risk weight preferential to the risk
weighting assigned to a claim on the sovereign of the corporate's country of incorpora-
tion.").
2 Basle Capital Accord: The First Revision Is Ou4 INT'L BANKER, June 7, 1999, avail-
able in 1999 WL 5992124.
2'2 See New Framework, supra note 10, annex 2, 1 18 ("The Committee now proposes
that the standard weighting of claims on corporates remains at 100%, but that a
weighting of 20% be given to claims on corporates of a very high quality. ... ").
2 See id. (stating that all loans to corporations below "a minimum rating of AA-"
would be adjudged at least a 100% risk weighting).
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norm under much of the standardised approach, despite the ratings
of external agencies. Many borrowers fall outside of the ambit of
credit rating agencies. For example, it may be inefficient for agencies
immediately to commit resources to rate small banks and corpora-
tions. Rating agencies are most prevalent in the domestic markets of
the United States and the United Kingdom, which leaves unrated
many non-American and non-British corporations." These entities
285would be assigned the 100% rate for unrated corporations. which is
the same rate the current regime assigns to claims on corporations.
The assessment of other instruments not usually rated by external
agencies, such as short-term, asset-backed investment vehicles, will
continue under the blanket categories currently in force. "I Virtually
everything else will be weighted under the 1988 Accord standards.
For instance, there will be no change to the 50% risk weight imputed
287on mortgages for residential properties. Credit conversion factors
for off-balance sheet items currently in force will essentially remain
unmodified.2  Since many assets will receive the same blanket risk
weight under the proposal as they do under the current Accord, the
Committee's revision of the risk-weighting process falls short of ex-
punging all incentives for arbitrage.
The second major flaw of the Basle Capital Accord is its failure to
provide a comprehensive definition of regulatory capital.289 The Basle
Committee remains unrepentant for this omission, stating that it
"does not propose at this stage to make further amendments to the
definition of capital."290 As a result, countries will continue to employ
2 This topic will be discussed in the evaluation of the proposal's efforts to level
the playing field among member nations. See infra text accompanying notes 296-98.
28' See New Framework, supra note 10, annex 2, 1 20, tbl. 1 (showing that claims of
unrated "corporates" would be assigned a 100% risk weight).
2m See New Capital Proposal Hits Short-Term ABS, RNANCIAL MODERNIZATION REP.,
June 21, 1999, at 1 (discussing how the proposal will not help short-term asset-backed
securities since they are not usually assessed by external credit rating agencies).
"8 See New Framework, supra note 10, annex 2, I 21 (stating that "lending fully se-
cured by mortgages on residential property... should continue to be weighted at
50%").
28 See id. annex 2, 1 25 ("The Committee is not proposing to change the existing
conversion factors for off-balance-sheet items ... ."). There is one small exception,
commitments, which will not remain the same if the new proposal is adopted. "Given
that even short-term commitments entail some risk, the Committee is proposing a
credit conversion factor of 20%, which would principally apply to business commit-
ments." Id. 1 26.
" See supra text accompanying notes 168-72 (discussing the second "sin" of the Ac-
cord).
m New Framework, supra note 10, annex 2, 1.
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varying definitions of capital, thus thwarting the Committee's goal of
uniformity.
The Committee's neglect of the second flaw evidences its refusal
to amend the third major defect of the 1998 Accord, the inflexible
and somewhat random adoption of the 8% capital ratio.29 Although
there is a possibility of varying capital ratios if the Committee were to
allow banks to use their own credit risk models, the standardised and
internal ratings-based approach both would be subject to the same 8%
regulatory capital requirement. As in the original Accord, the Com-
mittee again offers no extensive explanation for the ratio. Although
some bankers object that the ratio requirement is too high, many
economists argue that it is too low "Historical evidence on bank capi-
tal structure, as well as evidence on how banks and other financial in-
stitutions today choose capital ratios when they are subject to market
discipline, suggests that minimum capital ratios should be higher than
those currently in place.0
2
In refusing to amend the definition of capital and the required ra-
tio amount, the Committee has essentially failed to address the fourth
flaw of the 1988 Accord.29 The Committee's presumption that equity
cushions credit risk better than debt will continue to remain a theo-
retical underpinning if the proposal becomes the new Accord. Since
common shareholders will gain directly from higher yields on riskier
assets, they have less incentive than debtholders to ensure that com-
mercial banks are more conservative risk takers. 2 4
The fifth major flaw of the 1988 Accord is the Committee's belief
that capital standards alone could level the international playing
field.2m 5 Although the Basle Committee has long boasted of its role in
leveling the playing field among nations, it "did not attempt to ad-
dress the numerous tax, accounting, economic and regulatory differ-
ences between nations which create inequalities among banks.' Ot In
29 See supra text accompanying notes 173-77 (discussing the third "sin" of the Ac-
cord).
Improving the Basle Committee's New Capital Adequacy Framework- Joint Statement by a
Sub-Group of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committees of Europe, Japan, and the U.S. (vis-
ited Feb. 8, 2000) <http://,"vw.aei.org/shdw/shdwbasle.htm> [hereinafter Improving
the New Framework].
2 See supra text accompanying notes 178-80 (discussing the fourth "sin" of the Ac-
cord).
2" See infra Part V.A (discussing the reasons why subordinated debt holdings may
be a better form of regulatory capital than common equity).
5 See supra text accompanying notes 181-89 (discussing the fifth "sin" of the Ac-
cord).
2" Alford, supra note 26, at 218.
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fact, the Basle Accord has not only failed to level the playing field, but
also made the field even more uneven for some nations. In the New
Framework, the Committee finally admitted that uniform capital ade-
quacy standards alone are insufficient to establish a level playing field
298for global banking. The establishment of a level playing field is a
laudable goal, for the global synthesis of national markets inevitably
leads to greater efficiency and aggregate wealth. Therefore, even if
capital adequacy standards alone are not sufficient to bring about this
process, regulators should at least avoid creating standards that in-
crease inequities among participating nations. The proposal, regretta-
bly, does just this.
The proposal is likely to increase the capital burden on nations
with banking systems less developed than the United States. First,
since the internal ratings-based approach is reserved for only the most
"sophisticated banks,"m the majority of the participants in this alter-
native risk-weighing system are most likely to be the colossal banking
giants of the United States (and perhaps the United Kingdom, Ger-
many, and Japan as well). Since the internal ratings-based approach
will reduce the minimum capital requirement for eligible banks,
banks using the standardised approach will be left with comparably
higher capital requirements per asset dollar, effectively sustaining a
competitive disadvantage.
Even within the standarised approach, banks based in some coun-
tries will profit by the proposal, while others will lose. The reliance on
external rating agencies will act as the catalyst behind this divide.
Since those corporations and banks that lack a rating will receive a de-
fault weighting of 100%, banks that loan to these entities will be at a
disadvantage compared to banks that hold claims on highly rated
banks and corporations. The most predominant rating agencies
(Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch IBCA) assess almost exclu-
sively banks and corporations from the United States and the most de-
veloped European nations. Thus, "while the linkage with ratings by
agencies removes the earlier broad-brush treatment of all corporates,
it does leave scope for inequity for the mass of corporates still not
-7 See supra text accompanying notes 181-89 (discussing the failure of the Basle Ac-
cord to level the playing field among member nations).
2m The Committee forthrightly admits that "differences in national accounting,
tax, legal and banking structures will inevitably create differences between national
markets and that the use of banking supervisory rules cannot address all these differ-
ences." New Framework, supra note 10, 1 14.
New Framework, supra note 10, Executive Summary, 7.
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rated.""' For third-world nations with many unrated banks and cor-
porations, such as India, the amount of capital required per bank is
certain to increase.301
Surprisingly, even nations with elaborate financial and banking
systems, which do not currently rely on private rating agencies, may
suffer. For example, "about 8,000 U.S. companies have individual
credit ratings from outside agencies, [and] the same is true for only
30 companies in Germany.112 Some view the 100% default rate for
non-rated entities as a regulatory encumbrance selectively placed on
certain nations. Rolf Breuer, Chairman of the world's largest bank
(Deutsche Bank), has exclaimed: "If a rated company has to be
backed by a certain amount of capital and a non-rated company has to
carry a 'penalty supplement', then ... Germany would naturally be
well behind in comparison with U.S. standards. 3 13 Not only does the
Basle Committee acknowledge that a capital adequacy regime cannot
alone achieve a level playing field, but it disregards that goal com-
pletely by proposing a new framework that will further augment regu-
latory inequality among nations.
The sixth of the Basle Accord's seven deadly sins is its ignorance
of risk reduction engendered by diversification.3 0 Again, the New
Framework fails to address this flaw. For both the standardised and the
internal ratings-based approach, the Committee "rejects measuring
required capital based on a bank's entire portfolio, and instead incor-
rectly maintains the current approach of simply adding up the capital
required for individual asset categories." 5 Diversification may possi-
bly be included in the process by which adequate bank capital is de-
Venkitaramanan, supra note 137.
1 See Capital Adequacy: Striving Towards an Optimal Ratio, BUS. LINE, June 9, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 17712223 (stating that in terms of the new proposal, "Indian
banks will not score well on any of these counts"); Framework to Provide for Capital Flexi-
bility, EUR. BANKER, June 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 11536387 ("Banks with low
credit ratings will also have to face the possibility that the cost of international bank
borrowing will increase."); New Basle Norms To Raise Bank's Capital Needs, Bus.
STANDARD, Aug. 12, 1999, at 3 (stating that the "new Basle Committee norms on capi-
tal adequacy would increase the capital requirement of commercial banks in India").
" German Banks Say Basle Capital Adequacy Proposals Favour U.S., UK Rivals, AFX,
Sept. 29, 1999, available in 1999 WL 25405947.
Id. (quoting Deutsche Bank AG chairman RolfBreuer).
See supra text accompanying notes 190-91 (discussing the sixth "sin" of the Ac-
cord).
so0 Statement No. 156 of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee on September 27,
1999, The Basle Committee's New Capital Adequacy Framework (visited Nov. 22, 1999)
<http://www.aei.org/shdw/shdw156.htm> [hereinafter The Basle Committee's New Capi-
tal Adequacy Framework].
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termined. This possibility exists with credit-isk modeling since the
bank, through internal mathematical analytical tools, assesses the de-
fault risk of the entire portfolio. The Committee, however, has made
it clear that although credit risk models are on the horizon, individual
banks' use of them will not be universally permitted by the next Ac-
cord. Therefore, diversification will continue to be excluded from the
calculation of total asset risk even if the new proposal is adopted.
The seventh flaw of the Basle Accord is its ineffectiveness in regu-
lating complex financial instruments and transactions that are becom-
ing more prevalent in banking.0 6 The credit and other economic
risks associated with derivatives were not sufficiently addressed by the
initial Accord of 1988. Subsequent suggestions for dealing with these
atypical but growing banking activities came in the form of additional
consultative papers.0 7 Nonetheless, the original risk-weighted catego-
ries and crude capital ratio has remained the mainstay of national
regulatory regimes, even with respect to derivatives. Rather than seek-
ing to approximate the genuine risk involved with many off-balance-
sheet transactions, the Basle Committee designed its rules "to accom-
modate the capacities and habits of government regulators who can-
not master more analytically complex guidelines."30'
Aside from the stream of subsequent suggestions following the
Accord, no significant changes in the assessment of derivatives are ex-
pected to transpire, even if the new proposal is adopted. The Basle
Committee has decided to retain its analytically simplistic treatment of
derivatives in lieu of more complex guidelines. Derivative transac-
tions, which do not initially result in alterations of the balance sheet,
are currently risk-weighted by credit-conversion factors. The Commit-
tee has decided not to amend materially the fixed credit conversion-
factors for off-balance-sheet items.s That many banks have additional
subsidiaries and branches operating abroad, which engage in the fa-
' See supra text accompanying notes 192-99 (discussing the seventh "sin" of the
Accord).
"' See supra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing subsequent amendments
to the 1988 Accord that included capital cushions for market risk).
James B. Ransom, Note, "Capital Adequacy" in Crisis: Towards an Optional Bank
Deposit Insurance Regim4 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC. LJ. 445, 453 (1998).
mg See New Framework, supra note 10, annex 2, 1 25 ("The Committee is not propos-
ing to change the existing conversion factors for off-balance-sheet items ... ."); Rich-
ard M. Schetman, Legal Aspects of "Netting" in Respect of Insolvent Derivative Products Coun-
terparties, in BROKER-DEAL.R REGULATION 87, 137-40 (1999) (explaining how the
netting of derviatives would basically remain unchanged under the new Basle pro-
posal).
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cilitation of derivative transactions, continues to intensify the problem
of ensuring ample capital cushions and far-reaching supervision2 '0
E. Additional Problems with the New CapitalAdequacy Framework
The new proposal does little to ameliorate the flaws of the 1988
Accord. In addition, the Basle Committee's 1999 proposal may intro-
duce entirely new dilemmas into the already perplexed capital ade-
quacy regime. The sources of these new complications are the use of
external rating agencies and the eventual move toward internal credit
risk models. Both of these integral components of the Committee's
vision of a future capital adequacy regime are severely problematic.
1. Evaluation of Rating Agencies
Many commentators view the infusion of rating agencies into the
current framework as a breath of fresh air in a system now stale from
regulatory imprecision. "Ratings are a proxy for what the market
thinks" about sovereigns, banks, and corporations. Since markets
dynamically respond to information and since risk-weighted categories
such as those established in 1988 are continually static, rating agencies
are far superior in assessing an individual entity's ability to pay its
debts.,312 Even though rating agencies are theoretically presumed to
310 See Alain Hirsch, Supedsion of Bank Groups, TRENDS AND FORCES IN
INTERNATIONAL BANKING LAW 62, 72 (1990) ("Faced with the reality of bank groups,
national supervisory agencies have been led to realize that separate supervision of dif-
ferent banks in a group is insufficient."); BIS Reviews Basle Committee Guidelines, EUR.
BANKER, Feb. 24, 1999, available in 1999 WL 11536292 (reporting that "banks are grow-
ing to global proportions and more income is being generated from trading and other
nontraditional fee-generating areas, risk is becoming much harder to keep track of").
3 Basle Accord Revision Looking to Ratings, CFO ALERT, Nov. 23, 1998, available in
1999 WL 5283722.
3 See Phillips & Rechtschaffen, supra note 40, at 1762-63 ("[C]redit rating agencies
enhance the capital markets infrastructure by distilling a great deal of information into
a single credit rating for a security. That rating reflects the informed judgment of the
agency regarding the issuer's ability to meet the terms of the obligation."). Some also
believe that entities change their risk behavior to avoid getting poor ratings by external
agencies. See supra text accompanying note 256 (discussing that banks conform their
internal credit risk models to a preferred rating by an external agency). Thus, one
conclusion is that once banks become fully subject to external credit ratings, they will
adjust their capital ratio to receive a better rating. Others suggest that credit rating
agencies do not have such a dynamic effect on the entities they assess:
The evidence in support of the hypothesis that banks raise their capital ra-
tios as a response to pressure from rating agencies is inconclusive. All bankers
who have been involved with their organisation's contacts with rating agencies
know that this is indeed a major topic of discussion, but the empirical evi-
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bring greater accuracy to the risk assessment system, their incorpora-
tion into a regulatory framework may yield undesirable results.
The first problem with rating agencies is questionable accuracy.
Some scholars assert that rating agencies have "had only a mixed track
record" at best 13 In fact, commentators have alleged that even the
Basle Committee "is aware that rating agencies, in general, have not
covered themselves with glory in the recent past while assessing na-
tional economies and systems, especially in South-East Asia.
3 14
The second problem is that, even assuming arguendo that rating
agencies are accurate, the worldwide dearth in agencies could retard
the proposal's implementation.315  Even existing agencies doubt that
they could effectively expand operations to meet the needs of bank
316regulators.
An inherent conflict of interest between the agency and its rated
client is a third, and significant, problem. Rating agencies are only
successful today because the public is confident in their ability both to
317accurately and impartially assess individual entities. The Basle pro-
posal could threaten this equilibrium since "increasing the reliance on
ratings for setting prudential standards in bank regulation creates an
incentive for ratings agencies to serve the interest of the borrowers be-
ing rated, and thus subverts the original purpose credit ratings were
intended to serve."
318
A final problem is that excessive dependence on questionable rat-
dence suggests that the link between capital ratios and credit ratings is not as
strong as one might think.
MATrEN, supra note 23, at 11.
313 Interview with Richard J. Herring, Professor of International Banking and Fi-
nance, The Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania, in Philadel-
phia, Pa. (Nov. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Herring Interview].
-14 Venkitaramanan, supra note 137; see also Statement No. 160, supra note 11
("[R]atings agencies move slowly, and changes in ratings lag changes in actual credit
quality, so that the ratings have a questionable ability to predict default. Indeed, the
record of the ratings agencies before the recent Asian financial crisis was particularly
poor.").
315 See supra Part III.E (discussing the lack of rating agencies in countries outside
the United States and United Kingdom as making the playing field among nations
even more uneven).
116 See Venkitaramanan, supra note 137 ("Most rating agencies are still not
equipped adequately to handle large extra load cast on them.").
317 See Herring Interview, supra note 313 (discussing the circumstances to which
rating agencies currently owe their success).
318 Improving the New Framewor*, supra note 292; see also Statement No. 160, supra note
11 ("Ratings agencies would have incentives to engage in the financial equivalent of
'grade inflation' by supplying favorable ratings to banks seeking to lower their capital
requirements.").
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ing agencies will inevitably lead to "regulatory capture" of the banking
regulators of individual nations. If the proposal does not result in a
more prudent and efficient capital adequacy regime when regulators
hand over the reigns of risk-weighting to private enterprises, regula-
tors will have a difficult time repossessing those reigns. In summary,
rating agencies may bring further chaos to the international capital
adequacy regime because their assessments may be inaccurate, limited
in scope, and prejudicial in their appraisals, thus acting as a barrier
against swift regulatory intervention.
2. Evaluation of Internal Credit Risk Models
The incorporation of credit risk models into the current capital
adequacy framework may initially make banks, national regulators,
and the Basle Committee sanguine. Credit risk models would effec-
tively remove the entire hodgepodge of artificial risk weights, desul-
tory capital ratios, vague definitions of capital, and summing of indi-
vidual asset risks from the realm of capital adequacy regulation. With
these internal models delineating risks and allocating capital, "the
relevant institutional players in international banking law" could sat-
isfy their interests."19 Internal models would provide banks with more
leverage in determining which borrowers to select, how best to diver-
sify their portfolios, and how much risk to assume, all contributing to
the individual bank's ability "to make money, or to hedge risks so as to
avoid losing money."20 National regulators would supervise the
banks' implementation of these internal models without the reproach
of the banking industry for enacting rules that are too inflexible. The
Basle Committee could escape criticism from both bankers and regu-
lators around the world, while continuing "to retain its status as a
highly regarded forum for central bankers."3" With these incentives
facing banks, national regulators, and the Committee, it appears that
the move toward internal models will be a virtual regulatory utopia for
the international banking community.
Credit risk models, however, pose several challenges to achieving
a system of effective bank capital regulation. The first problem is that
credit risk models are currently unreliable. In studies conducted by
both American and European regulators, various credit risk models
119 Bhala, supra note 4, at 11.
s Id at 13.
321 Id. at 17.
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were not able to withstand the scrutiny of national banking officials.22
Unlike the legions of bankers working to develop enhanced credit risk
models, many regulators believe that "the search for... model[s] is a
futile one. " 3ss One reason why these models are currently unreliable is
that "[m] ost of the models on the market tend to extrapolate data and
observations from the world's best-developed markets-predomi-
nantly the U.S. bond and equity markets-and apply them to markets
where the parameters may be completely different."324 How can such
models accurately evaluate the loans made to nations and entities in
Asia and other emerging markets? Many simply believe they cannot.
Perhaps one solution for banks using credit risk models is the
compilation of "a global database of default and credit history."3,2
This solution, however, would require banks to invest an enormous
amount of resources, possibly offsetting any benefits derived from
these models. A more fundamental cause of the credit models' unre-
liability is their exclusive reliance on data relating to past events.
Since large sectors of the world economy are subject to volatile
change, a fortior4 most individual firms are even more susceptible to
changes in financial conditions. Therefore, any method of evaluating
risk that depends on past conditions alone is destined to be impre-
326
cise.
A second problem with credit risk models is the potential for in-
dustry capture of bank regulators.32 Because of the innate complexity
322 See FEDERAL RESERVE Sys. TASK FORCE ON INTERNAL CREDIT RISK MODELS,
CREDIT RISK MODELS AT MAJOR U.S. BANKING INSTILIONS: CURRENT STATE OF THE
ART AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSESSMENTS OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY 33-34 (May 1998)
(discussing the Federal Reserve's finding that credit risk models failed various tests
performed by regulators and are not likely to be depended upon to set capital stan-
dards); David Shirreff, Models Get a Thrashing, EUROMONEY, Oct. 1998, at 31 ("Euro-
pean regulators concluded that the models were 'half-baked' and could not be used to
set regulatory capital.").
323 Basle Accord Revision Looking to Ratings, supra note 311.
324 See Shirreff, supra note 322, at 32.
326 d326 See Mingo, supra note 34, at 54 (noting that "'models-based' approaches to capi-
tal adequacy could become as ineffective as the traditional ratio-based approaches may
now be, and may impose similar unnecessary costs on banks, unless regulators ap-
proach the problems of prudential regulation in systematic fashion").
32 See Darringer, supra note 192, at 334 (asserting that while there is a risk that this
models-based approach could lead to capture of the bank regulators, the Basle guide-
lines and audit procedures should prevent industry capture). With regard to the as-
sessment of market risk of various derivative instruments, recent amendments have
permitted banks to use internal risk models. See BASLE COMM. ON BANKING
SuPERvIsION, AN INTERNAL MODEL-BASED APPROACH TO MARKET RISK CAPITAL
REQUIREMENTS (Apr. 1995) (discussing the use of internal models in determining
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of these models, bank regulators may fail to understand the model's
intricacies, effectively handing the reigns of regulation over to the
regulated banks themselves.328 That individual banks may use their
own distinct models will compound this problem. If regulatory bod-
ies wish to adequately supervise banks' use of internal models, they
will have to increase the size and improve the skills of their staffs,
thereby creating an additional burden on taxpayers financing the
regulatory regime. Additionally, since internal models are considered
intellectual property, their inner workings are shrouded in the utmost
secrecy. Only bank regulators, not members of the general public,
would have the opportunity to learn how such models operate. This
may give rise to an ancillary basis of regulatory capture. 'When in-
formation about internal risk management is not made public, and
when the determination of the reasonableness of bank risk estimates
remains in the hands of bank regulators, the possibility of regulatory
forbearance must be considered a distinct possibility."3 '0 Therefore,
the Basle Committee should reconsider the incorporation of credit
risk models into a future capital adequacy framework since the mod-
els' accuracy is doubtful and the risk of regulatory capture is great.
What may seem to be a more efficient means of conducting capital al-
location may be more costly and risky for participants in this multi-
billion dollar regulatory regime.331
market risk). These models must be regulated by audit and other procedures. Credit
risk, however, is one of the major problems facing banks today. The use of credit risk
models would provide far more power to banks in determining adequate capital than
using models to measure only market risk.
"S eeTaylor, supra note 37, at 802 (noting that "the supervisory community gener-
ally lacks the human resources to be able to monitor the more sophisticated risk man-
agement systems").
32 See MATrEN, supra note 23, at 51 ("[I]mbalance[s] between internal and exter-
nal models makes it very difficult for the internal model to be simply a more accurate
version of the regulatory model, with higher levels of granularity.").
3" Improving the New Framework, supra note 292; see also The Basle Committee's New
CapitalAdequacy Framework, supra note 305 (noting that "it is likely to be politically and
economically difficult for government agencies to penalize banks when they suffer
losses and become undercapitalized, particularly when information about bank com-
pliance remains solely in the hands of the regulators").
-" See Arturo Estrella, Formulas or Supervision? Remarks on the Future of Regulatory
Capita ECON. POLY REv., Oct. 1998, at 192 (arguing that "scarce public resources are
better employed to enhance supervision than to develop new formulas whose payoff
may be largely illusory"); Mingo, supra note 34, at 54 (asserting that "'models-based'
approaches to capital adequacy could become as ineffective as the traditional ratio-
based approaches may now be, and may impose similar unnecessary costs on banks,
unless regulators approach the problems of prudential regulation in systematic fash-
ion"); Shirreff, supra note 322, at 32 (remarking that "modellers [are metaphorically]
in search of the holy grail").
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V. THE SHADOW COMMITTEE PROPOSAL
The Basle Committee's lead role as a promulgator of international
soft law has led not only bankers and lawyers, but also academics, to
pay careful attention to its pronouncements. For approximately fif-
teen years,332 a committee of American law professors and economists
engaging in "research or practicing in the field of finance" has met
periodically to evaluate financial regulations.3 " This group, now re-
ferred to as the Shadow Committee, gathers its members "from aca-
demic institutions and private organizations and reflect[s] a wide
range of views."' 3 The Shadow Committee thus represents a group of
disinterested scholars seeking to ensure that the international banking
system is regulated in a manner that promotes both efficiency and
safety.335 The success of the Committee's activities, primarily its ex-
haustive evaluation of public policy proposals by governments and
other influential bodies, has led to the establishment of sister commit-
tees in Europe and Japan.36 The American Shadow Committee re-
cently proposed an alternative to the 1999 Basle Committee's New
Framework. Because of the Shadow Committee's respect and influence
in the international financial community, 1 its alternative proposal has
attracted the attention of the international banking community.
s2 See Herring Interview, supra note 313 (discussing the number of years the U.S.
Shadow Committee has existed).
Shadow Fin. Regulatory Comm., About the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee
(visited Dec. 1, 1999) <http://www.aei.org/shdw/shdw.htm> [hereinafter About the
Shadow Committee].
"' Shadow Fin. Regulatory Comm., Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee: Statement
of Purpose (visited Dec. 1, 1999) <http://www.aei.org/shdw/shdwpur.htm>.
'3 See id (laying out the Shadow Committee's goals).
33 See Shadow Fin. Regulatory Comm., European Shadow Financial Reulatory Commit-
tee--A New Initiative (visited Dec. 1, 1999) <http://wwv.aei.org/shdw/shdweuro.htrn>
(describing the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee ("ESFRC") as a
"group of European professors and experts in the field of banking, finance, and regu-
lation of financial services").
M7 The Shadow Committee is composed of such notable scholars as GeorgeJ. Ben-
ston of Emory University, Charles W. Calomiris of Columbia University, Franklin R.
Edwards of Columbia University, Scott E. Harrington of the University of South Caro-
lina, Richard J. Herring of the University of Pennsylvania, Paul M. Horvitz of the Uni-
versity of Houston, George G. Kaufman of Loyola University Chicago, Robert E. Litan
of Brookings Institution, Roberta Romano of Yale Law School, Hal S. Scott of Harvard
Law School, Kenneth E. Scott of Stanford University, and Peter J. Wallison of the
American Enterprise Institute. See About the Shadow Committee, supra note 333 (listing
the committee members).
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A. The Basics: The Uninsured Subordinated Debt Requirements
One of the seven deadly sins of the original Basle Accord is its
chief premise that equity holdings form a superior cushion to debt
holdings.3 "9 Although common equity is more perpetual than debt in-
struments, shareholders' incentives may not always align with the most
prudential risk management.30 The Shadow Committee's proposal
relies on this principle as the foundation of its suggested approach to
bank capital regulation. The proposal states that "[c]urrent regula-
tory capital standards clearly err by discriminating against subordi-
nated debt and preferred stock as components of bank capital." 1 In-
creasing the cast of debtholders in the context of capital adequacy
regulation will generate two potential benefits.
The Shadow Committee believes that subordinated debtholders
will themselves become "risk disciplinarians of banks," and that regu-
lators will accrue significant information rendered by "market signals
from subordinated debt yields."m2 The reason that debtholders would
assume a disciplinarian role is simple. If a bank increases its portfolio
risk without concurrently increasing its capital cushion, when the
bank itself attempts to borrow by taking a loan or issuing a bond, the
bank's new creditors will demand higher interest rates commensurate
to the bank's risk profile. Prospective lenders may also refuse to loan
M Subordinated debt is a "debt that can only be claimed by an unsecured creditor,
in the event of a liquidation, after the claims of secured creditors have been met."
SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 8, at 1249; see also Alford, supra note 26, at 190 ("Subor-
dinated debt includes interest-bearing obligations that pay a fixed amount at a future
date."). The term "uninsured" simply means that the subordinated debtholders will
not be reimbursed for losses by a deposit insurance regime in the event of the borrow-
ing bank's insolvency. See Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 40 (stating that truly un-
insured debt demands that the instrument not be subject to one of the "mechanisms
for bailing out" its holders (i.e., debt insurance)).
us See supra text accompanying notes 178-80 (explaining that debtholders may have
more incentives to insist that bankers do not issue risky loans).
0 See supra text accompanying notes 178-80 (noting that debtholders have a lim-
ited upside for their investments and cannot expect higher returns on their invest-
ments when the bank takes risks like shareholders can).
34 Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 29. The Shadow Committee also summa-
rizes the principal reason why debt may serve as a better cushion than common equity:
The incentives of debtholders are different because they hold a fixed income
claim. A fixed income claim does not entitle debtholders to share in upside
gains beyond their coupon payments, as shareholders do. Increased asset risk
benefits shareholders of insured banks when capital is low or negative and
deposit insurance is underpriced, but always hurts uninsured debtholders be-
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to the bank entirely, thus confining the bank's means of funding to
the costly issuance of equity or other securities. 43 Just as regular de-
positors want the bank to maintain a prudent risk profile, debtholders
also want the bank's asset risk to remain conservative, ensuring that
repayment is virtually doubtless. Since a major policy rationale of the
capital adequacy regime is to protect "depositors in the event of bank
insolvency,"'3 the introduction of disciplinarians-supplementary to
governmental authorities-whose economic interests are aligned with
deposit insurance agencies, would strengthen existing regulations.M
This would not be the only dynamic effect of increasing the role of
uninsured subordinated debtholders into the current Basle frame-
work.
The second benefit stems from the fact that debtholders will not
discipline banks in private. The discipline imposed on banks by their
lenders will be visible to regulators by the interest rates of the debt in-
struments. The greater the interest rate, the more precarious the
debtholders perceive the bank's assets to be. Hence, "high yields pro-
duce an audible, undeniable 'cannon shot' heard by all." "6 Since
multiple market participants will appraise the borrowing bank's entire
risk environment, interest rates are likely to reflect more precisely the
bank's actual degree of solvency. "Market yields on bank debt will re-
flect the risks banks are taking whether those risks appear on the bal-
ance sheet or reside off the balance sheet, and whether they are im-
plicit or explicit.'347 Therefore, regulators could monitor yields on a
bank's uninsured subordinated debt, using such information in their
assessment of whether the bank is holding adequate capital.3 4
3 See id. at 30-31 ("[I]f a bank suffered losses of asset value and increases in asset
risk, vigilant subordinated debtholders... would discipline the bank by raising the
cost of finance, curtailing the amount of finance, or requiring the bank to act in credi-
ble ways to reduce asset risk or raise equity.").
344 Alford, supra note 26, at 191.
See Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 30 ("The incentives of uninsured deb-
tholders in measuring and penalizing risk are aligned with the deposit insurer, not the
bank shareholders."); see also Statement No. 160, supra note 11 ("[T] he presence of sub-
ordinated debt reduces banks' incentives to take on inappropriate risks because, for
solvent banks, the incentives of the subordinated debt holders and the deposit insur-
ance agency are aligned.").
46 Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 50; see also Statement No. 160, supra note 11
("[I]ncreases in the interest yield on existing traded debt provide a warning from in-
vestors of the risks banks are taking.").
47 Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 32.
348 According to the Shadow Committee, "The decisions of subordinated deb-
tholders would provide powerful information about bank risk to supervisors and regu-
lators, and to the public at large, thus facilitating the management of risk and capital
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The Shadow Committee asserts that imposing a mandatory unin-
sured subordinated debt requirement will not overly burden regu-
lated banks. In fact, it has publicly stated that "it is highly unlikely that
the annualized issuing costs of subordinated debt would be as high as
those of equity."39 In many nations, interest payments to debtholders
are excluded from taxable income.3 50 The banking system as a whole
may also benefit from a potential transformation from book value ac-
counting to market value accounting.351 The two main benefits of
debtholders playing a more central cast in capital adequacy regula-
tion, along with the aforementioned secondary advantages, has led
the Shadow Committee to support the addition of an uninsured sub-
ordinated debt requirement to the current Basle Accord. More spe-
cifically, the Shadow Committee has proposed "a minimum subordi-
nated debt requirement of 2% of non-cash assets."
352
B. The Specifics: Additional Regulations
Simply amending the current capital adequacy guidelines to re-
quire banks to hold uninsured subordinate debt will be insufficient to
secure the benefits of the Shadow Committee's proposal. Adequate
legal safeguards must also accompany the new 2% debt obligation.
There are two major obstacles to establishing a successful uninsured
subordinated debt requirement. First, the uninsured debt must be
standards by regulators." Id. at 31.
9 Statement No. 160, supra note 11. The Shadow Committee conducted a study
comparing the costs of issuing equity to issuing subordinated debt for large U.S. banks
during the period of 1995-1999. The results support the contention that equity is a
more expensive form of capital for banks.
The present value of issuing costs for bank subordinated-debt offerings sold to
the public averaged 1.53 percent of offerings. The average issuing cost for
common stock offerings sold to the public for the same sample of banks was
3.46 percent. Thus, the transaction costs of subordinated-debt offerings are
less than half those of common stock offerings for large U.S. banks.
Id.
See Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 34 (stating that "because of the deducti-
bility of interest payments... [there is a] tax advantage favoring subordinated debt").
But see Alford, supra note 26, at 211 ("The disadvantage of subordinated debt over eq-
uity is that bank operating income is decreased by the interest charges on the debt.").
' See Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 33 (noting that a "deep market in unin-
sured bank debt would produce a new demand for clear accounting").
S2 Id. at 47. The Shadow Committee proposes that uninsured subordinated debt
have a minimum maturity with maturity dates evenly spaced. See id. at 48 ("A mini-
mum maturity is necessary to limit the ability of subordinated debtholders to flee with-
out bearing losses when banks suffer losses on assets."); see also Statement No. 160, supra
note 11 (proposing that "large banks be required to back at least 2 percent of their
outstanding assets and off-balance-sheet commitments with subordinated debt").
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truly uninsured. If debtholders believe that the government will bail
them out when the bank becomes insolvent, the moral hazards of de-
posit insurance will encourage debtholders to lighten their role as dis-
ciplinarians a. 3 5  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC")
is permitted under federal law to pay holders of bank subordinated
debt in the event of the issuer's insolvency.35 To make the uninsured
debt requirement workable, "any payments from the FDIC to the
holders of mandated subordinated debt should be legally prohib-
ited."355 Other nations with similar deposit insurance frameworks also
would have to curtail payments to subordinated debtholders included
in the 2% requirement.
In addition to the possibility that deposit insurance agencies could
ruin debtholders' incentives to discipline banks, there lies another po-
tential dilemma. Under the Shadow Committee's proposal, banks will
have a vested interest to maintain low yields on their subordinated
debt. There are two ways banks can accomplish this. First, banks can
act prudently in allocating risk and conducting their transactions.
Regulators implementing the proposal will try to foster this method of
achieving low yields. Secondly, banks can purchase their own debt at
an inflated value in order to avoid high interest rates or, alternatively,
can collude with other banks.5 6 It is evident that artificial pricing of
debt by banks could block the effectiveness of the proposed 2% re-
"3 See Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 40 (contending that "for subordinated
debt (or any uninsured debt) issued by a bank to be a source of market discipline, and
for its yield to reflect market perceptions of default risk, that debt must be credibly unin-
sured"). Deposit insurance often impairs market discipline by providing participants
with an ultimate safety net. See Ransom, supra note 308, at 447 ("Deposit insurance
'gets in the way of the depositors signaling a bank when it takes excessive risks.'" (quot-
ing Laurence H. Meyer, The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry and Result-
ing Challenges to Regulators: Speech Before the Ohio Bankers Day Conference (Nov.
21, 1996), available in Federal Reserve Bd., FRB: Federal Reserve Board Speech from
11/21/96 (visited May 22, 1998) <http://w-v,.bog.frb.fed.us/BOARDDOCS/
SPEECHES/19961121.htm>)).
"" See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) (4) (1994) (specifying the limits on the FDIC's ability to
reimburse subordinated debtholders). The current rule is rather complicated:
The FDIC may only do so if the cost to it of the assisted acquisition does not
exceed the cost of a bank liquidation, which is defined as the sum of insured
deposits minus the present value of the total net amount to be reasonably ex-
pected from a straight liquidation.
Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 41.
355 Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 41.
36 See id. at 43 ("By purchasing their bank's debt at a price above its true value the
owners would both lose and gain equal amounts on the transaction, so overpaying for
its debt would entail no net cost. ... [and would] permit a weak or insolvent bank to
appear strong. .. ").
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL ADEQUACYRULES
quirement. Additional regulation is necessary to ensure that all trans-
actions involving the mandatory subordinated debt are done at arms-
length, effectively restraining the ability of banks to engage in self-
dealing.357 The mainstay of this supplementary regulation would re-
quire banks to disclose the various parties with whom they have dealt
respecting debt issues.3
Apart from supplementary regulations intended to achieve the
twin goals of the subordinated debt requirement, namely, increasing
market discipline and market signaling, the Shadow Committee pro-
poses other changes to the current Accord as well. First, it calls for a
revision of the 8% capital ratio established in 1988 to a 10% ratio of
capital to non-cash assets.359 Some economists have criticized the cur-
rent ratio for being too small.356 Second, it calls for the dissolution of
the two-tiered system currently in place, replacing it with a general
capital requirement using the mandated, uninsured, subordinated
debt comprising 2%.3"' Third, the Shadow Committee's proposal peti-
tions for the "elimination of risk weights on assets," and calls for "the
use of a uniform 100% risk weight foi all non-cash assets." 62 Although
this amendment is perhaps the most radical of the Shadow Commit-
tee's departures from the Basle framework, the change is justified on
the grounds that "risk weights [would] no longer distort bank decision
57 To avoid this problem, the Shadow Committee proposes:
[Regulators should] require that purchasers of subordinated debt be entities
that have no direct or indirect connection to the issuer. ... [B]orrowers from
the bank, affiliates within the issuing bank's holding company, firms managed
or owned by major shareholders of the issuing bank, or firms with other sig-
nificant dealings with the bank ... should be prohibited from purchasing its
subordinated debt.
Id.
See i& at 44 ("Disclosure requirements that require that holders disclose their
identity to regulators would facilitate enforcement of the arms-length holding re-
quirement.").
59 See id. at 36 (asserting that "10% is a conservative estimate of what the market
would require"); see also Statement No. 160, supra note 11 ("Accordingly, we recommend
that regulators raise the requirement-at least for large banks-to something on the
order of 10 percent of (unweighted) on-balance-sheet assets and off-balance-sheet
commitments.").
'6 See, eg., MYRON L. KWAsT & WAYNE PASSMORE, FEDERAL RESERVE BD., TE
SUBSIDY PROVIDED BY THE FEDERAL SAFETY NET: THEORY, MEASUREMENT AND
CONTAINMENT 27-29 (1997) (discussing that financial institutions in the United States
that are similar to banks maintain, on average, a capital ratio greater than 10%).
m See Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 3 (stating the Shadow Committee's
commitment to "eliminating the distinction between Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital").
M2 Id. at 34; see also Statement No. 160, supra note 11 ("Accordingly, we favor the
elimination of regulatory risk weights on assets, on and off the balance sheet.").
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making as they have in the past... [and that] the risks banks would
create would be measured and penalized by subordinated debthold-
ers. " s6 The paradigm of regulation proposed by the Shadow Commit-
tee would require much less supervision from national regulators be-
cause subordinated debtholders will serve as the primary
disciplinarians.
The implementation of the 2% uninsured subordinated debt re-
quirement would simplify the monitoring and enforcement process of
bank regulators. Since yield rates on the debt would reflect the bank's
credit risk, regulators would promptly receive notice of large devia-
tions in credit risk. To ensure that a bank's insolvency risk did not
reach an exceedingly precarious rate, national regulators, or even the
Basle Committee, could establish a maximum yield spread•. Periodi-
cally, bank regulators would have to examine the disclosure docu-
ments of the banks, as well as complete audits to ensure the nonexist-
ence of self-dealing and the bank's compliance with all other
restrictions.m If a bank failed to remain within its maximum yield
spread, regulators could impose sanctions commensurate to the quan-
titative violation of the spread and intervene quickly to prevent insol-
veny. The Shadow Committee proposal thus attempts to solidify
Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 35. In its most recent public statement, the
Shadow Committee remained fervent in its stance to eliminate the current risk-weight
categories of the Basle Accord:
[A] limit on leverage, without the complication of risk weighting, has the ad-
vantage of greater simplicity and is less misleading, since it does not purport
to weigh the relative risks associated with broad categories of assets. Moreo-
ver, a straightforward leverage requirement reduces banks' incentives to ma-
nipulate required capital by shifting assets among risk-weight categories, when
those shifts do not represent real changes in portfolio risk.
Statement No. 160, supra note 11.
s6 "A maximum yield spread would force adjustment to take place in quantities,
notjust prices, and thus would have an automatic stabilizing effect on the permissible
level of risky assets in the bank." Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 50. In its most
recent public statement, the Shadow Committee has proposed the following bright-
line rule for tracking yield spreads. "Whenever, for three consecutive months, the
yield on the qualifying subordinated debt of a bank rises above the yield of moderately
risky corporate bonds (say, those rated BBB or Baa) with similar maturity, the bank is
considered to be in violation of its subordinated-debt requirement." Statement No. 160,
supra note 11.
'6 See Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 39 ("Supervisors would ascertain the exis-
tence of bona fide outstanding subordinated debt contracts that satisfy the law's re-
quirements.").
66 The Shadow Committee recognizes that the insured subordinated debt re-
quirement will lead to quicker intervention among regulatory authorities. "Structured
early intervention and resolution, as codified in the United States under FDICIA, pro-
vides a powerful tool for holding banks accountable to regulations, and is particularly
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the partnership between market participants and regulators in ensur-
ing that banks maintain adequate capital. In essence, this alternative
contends that "private market discipline can be used by the govern-
ment: to restrict default risk, to price default risk, and to penalize de-
fault risk."3
7
SUMMARY OF SHADOW COMMITTEE
PROPOSED STANDARDS
Characteristics of Mandatory Debt Issuer6
Type of Uninsured Debt - Subordinated debt
Required Amount- 2% of non-cash assets (on- and off-balance sheet)
Maturity at Date of Issue - Minimum of 2 years, Maximum of 3 years,
Maturity extendable
Spacing of Maturing Offerings - Limit bunching of maturity dates
Use of Yield Spreads -
Vary deposit insurance fees with observed yield spreads
Trigger regulatory intervention penalties
Trigger extension of maturity on maturing sub. debt
Maximum Yield Spread - At issue date yield spread < current average
BBB yield
Arms-length Requirement - Qualifying sub debt cannot be held by
borrowers, affiliates, or shareholders debt requirement (based on
asset size)
Accompanying Regulations6
Least Cost Resolution - If LCR is invoked, qualifying subordinated
debtholders receive nothing from FDIC or from issuing bank
Disclosure of Holders - Holders of debt must disclose that they have
purchased debt and must affirm no connection to issuer (with
criminal penalties for fraud)
Repeal of Tier 1, Tier 2 - Banks would face minimal capital require
ment of 10%
Repeal of Risk Weighting - Capital requirement set relative to total
non-cash assets
valuable for enforcing quantitative rules .... The Shadow Committee recommends
the adoption of similar provisions in other countries." Id. at 52.
s Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
' ' Id. at 60.
569 Id.
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C. Evaluation of the Shadow Proposal
The Shadow Committee's proposal is distinctly the work of schol-
ars who have meticulously examined the international system of bank
capital regulation from a theoretical perspective. The proposal at-
tempts to align regulatory goals with elemental market realities. It
rectifies many of the flaws rampant in both the current standards and
the Basle Committee's New Framework. The Shadow Committee's pro-
posal harnesses the benefits stemming exclusively from the debt form
of regulatory capital. For some time, practitioners and scholars have
claimed that "bank issuance of subordinated debt should be encour-
aged because it is precisely the holders of these instruments who are
most likely to monitor and [be] least affected by moral hazard."3 7 '
The proposal also proffers a new capital ratio of 10% with at least
some analytical research to support the figure. The playing field may
become more even since insured subordinate debt is an uncompli-
cated instrument that all banks in every country could issue. Battling
among nations over what constitutes Tier 1 capital will cease when the
tiered system is eliminated.
The Shadow Committee proposal expunges the inflexible and
widely scorned risk-weight categories set forth in the 1988 Accord
from the regulatory regime. Unlike the Basle Committee, which has
proposed to delegate risk-weighting duties to external rating agencies
and the banks themselves, the Shadow Committee proposes a uniform
risk weight 7 1 Problems stemming from external rating agencies and
credit risk models, such as dependability and regulatory capture, will
not occur since the main disciplinarians, uninsured subordinated
creditors, possess incentives that naturally align with regulators rather
than the regulated. Furthermore, the regulatory supervision of yield
spreads is much less burdensome than the examination of rating
agency qualities, internal ratings-based systems, and intricate financial
risk models. Regulators could "increase reliance on market disci-
pline" while simultaneously ensuring that bank capital is sufficient to
cushion against credit risk.sn In a larger sense, the Shadow Commit-
370 Darringer, supra note 192, at 335.
17 See supra text accompanying note 362 (discussing the uniform 100% risk
weight).
372 Basle Reforms Overdue supra note 150; see alsoJosephJ. Norton & Christopher D.
Olive, The Ongoing Process of International Bank Regulatory and Supervisory Convergence: A
New Regulato,-Market "Partnership," 16ANN. REV. BANKINGL. 227, 229 (1997) (arguing
that, in the optimal capital adequacy regime, "regulatory and market participants must
interact compatibly, on an interdisciplinary basis, to provide an appropriate environ-
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tee's implicit abandonment of deposit insurance is a key step on the
path toward market discipline of the banking industrysn
Although the Shadow Committee proposal ameliorates many de-
fects of the current capital adequacy regime that the New Framework
fails to address, this proposal also poses several dilemmas. First, its to-
tal elimination of risk weighting is questionable. Even if the current
categories are artificial and somewhat inaccurate assessments of asset
risk, there are still significant risk differences that generally can be at-
tributed to assets on the basis of both the type of instrument and the
374type of borrower. When classifications of assets do not overlap en-
tirely with market realities of asset risk, regulatory arbitrage is certain
to occur. The risk-weighting of all non-cash assets at a flat 100% may
nurture even more arbitrage, since the least risky assets will require
the same amount of capital backing as the most risky. In one sense,
the Shadow Proposal may expand the hiatus between the regulatory
measures of risk and actual asset risk.
The Shadow Committee concedes that the fruition of its proposed
elimination of risk weights is "hard to judge" and acknowledges the
regulatory impossibility of truly assessing "the relative amounts of risk
across categories of assets or activities."3 75 Furthermore, the Shadow
Committee argues that the role of risk weights nevertheless will dimin-
ish anyway, since "the risks banks would create would be measured
and penalized by subordinated debtholders."3 76 Relying too much on
subordinated debtholders may exude a confidence in market infor-
mation which may or may not be consistently present.
ment for the necessary formation of a new regulatory-market 'partnership'").
STS SeeTaylor, supra note 37, at 805 ("The movement towards relying on greater use
of market forces and self-regulation can only be carried so far if there remains an ex-
plicit (or even implicit) taxpayer guarantee against the consequences of firm failure.").
374 For example, there is generally more risk associated with uncollaterized loans
than those that are fully collaterized, and generally it is riskier to loan to private busi-
ness than to a central government.
37' Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 35.
376 Id. In its most recent public statement, the Shadow Committee has argued that
the subordinated-debt requirement will reduce regulatory arbitrage regardless of the
risk-weighting system in place.
Banks would not benefit from moving assets off balance sheet or by creating
off-balance-sheet derivatives risks, because the private market (which is often
in a superior position to identify the risks of those off-balance-sheet transac-
tions) should incorporate those risks into the pricing of the bank's subordi-
nated debt. Thus, off-balance-sheet transactions that increase risk will be pe-
nalized by the market and, if the regulators rely on market signals to measure
risk, by the regulators as well.
Statement No. 160, supra note 11.
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A second questionable component of the Shadow Proposal is its
revision of the 8% capital ratio to 10% of all non-cash assets. At first
glance, the 10% figure seems just as desultory as the Basle Commit-
tee's own ratio. The Shadow Committee, however, supports this revi-
sion for two main reasons. American banks historically had main-
tained capital ratios of well above 10% until the establishment of the
Federal Reserve and the FDIC. 7 Recent studies illustrate that non-
regulated financial services companies also currently carry capital ra-
tios of well-above 10%.378 Although an analytical evaluation of the
Shadow Committee's argument is beyond the reach of this Comment,
its suppositions raise important questions. The fact that capital ratios
were well above 10% prior to the 1930s is not determinative that an
optimal capital ratio would be higher than 8% today. After all, the
very first banks, goldsmiths, kept a 100% capital cushion.3 7 9 It should
be no surprise that after hundreds of years of technological advance-
ments in payment systems and internal controls, the level of bank
capital required has decreased enormously. These same advance-
ments have probably continued to reduce the optimal capital level
since the 1930s 2 ° The Committee's data about unregulated financial
institutions also may be indeterminate. Financial services firms may
engage in inherently riskier activities, such as investment banking and
other more comprehensive derivative transactions in which banks do
not regularly engage.s1 These other institutions, therefore, may re-
quire higher capital ratios than banks.
A third problem with the Shadow Proposal is that monitoring
costs will increase in conjunction with the subordinated debt re-
quirement. The Shadow Committee even concedes that its plan could
result in "higher private market monitoring costs, and the greater dif-
27 See Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 7 (discussing capital ratios of U.S. banks
for the past hundred years).
378 See id. at 36 (stating that "U.S. finance companies today-which share functional
and structural features of banks, but do not enjoy safety net protection-maintain
capital ratios that typically exceed 10% of assets").
' See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 489 (noting that originally bank-
ers were goldsmiths who kept the entire stock of gold on hand until repayment).
Because federal deposit insurance has skewed the true optimal market level of
capital, we cannot prove this assertion. The Shadow Committee concedes that after
the full implementation of the "federal safety net," the optimal capital ratio has "set-
tled in the 6% to 8% range." Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 11.
881 With the recent constructive repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, see Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999), however, banks may be-
come indistinguishable from other financial institutions, thus strengthening the
Shadow Committee's position.
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ficulty in tracking holders of debt to ensure that it is held at arm-
slength."2 Although the subordinated debt requirement would give
rise to certain monitoring costs, the total cost outlay by regulators may
be less under this proposed regime than under the Basle Committee's
New Framewmo. Since the Basle Committee's proposal would require a
perpetual examination of rating agencies, internal rating systems, and
possibly numerous credit risk models, regulatory vigilance over debt
yields and debtholders may not produce greater costs. Thus, cost re-
ductions in other areas of supervision may actually offset the costs cre-
ated by the subordinated debt requirement.
A final difficulty with the subordinated debt requirement is the
numerous other laws necessary to secure the proposal's effectiveness.
Whereas the Basle Committee's proposal would require regulatory
changes implemented mainly by the central banks, the Shadow Com-
mittee's proposal demands legislative action outside of the ambit of
central banking authorities such as the Federal Reserve. For instance,
the proposal may require curtailing the bailout capacities of the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation under section 12 of the United
States Code. Along with this possible statutory change, the Shadow
Committee believes that arms-length disclosure requirements should
accompany a "criminal law sanction for persons acting in concert with
the bank or its owners" who violate provisions supplementing the sub-
ordinated debt requirement." These statutory changes would re-
quire acts of Congress, possibly hampering a prompt establishment of
the proposal's provisions. One of the most notable virtues of the 1988
Accord was the manner in which it was efficiently incorporated into
the capital adequacy regimes of so many nations. This was due to the
fact that many national governments granted their respective central
banks sole discretion to issue capital adequacy regulations.m In many
nations, however, the deposit insurance regime may be separated
from the central bank or agency that institutes bank capital stan-
en Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 46.
See i&. at 41-42 (discussing the FDIC's power under 12 U.S.C. 1823(c) (4) to bail
out subordinated debtholders and what means should be taken to eliminate this possi-
bility).
M4 Id. at 44.
See generally supra Part M.D (discussing the reasons for the prompt incorpora-
tion of the 1988 Accord into national regulatory regimes). The U.S. Congress has ex-
plicitly delegated rulemaking authority to the Federal Reserve in the realm of capital
adequacy. See International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 ("ISA"), Pub. L. No. 98-
181, tit. IX, § 908(a)(2), 97 Stat. 1278, 1280 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3907 (1994))
("Each appropriate Federal banking agency shall have the authority to establish such
minimum level of capital for a banking institution ....").
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dards. Therefore, the Shadow Committee proposal, although supe-
rior to the New Framework in many respects, may be much more diffi-
cult to implement fully in the international arena.
CONCLUSION
The epoch of capital adequacy regulation has been marked by the
promulgation of well-intentioned but ill-advised rules by banking
regulators around the world. The Basle Committee has essentially
succeeded in unifying national bank capital regulation. Unfortu-
nately, the 1988 Accord was wrought with so many flaws that its ubiq-
uitous rules induced omnipresent dilemmas. In the summer of 1999,
the Basle Committee introduced its New Framework, an alternative
regulatory regime designed to replace the Accord. The Committee's
proposal fails to repair many of the original defects of the 1988 Ac-
cord and introduces additional problems as well. The U.S. Shadow
Committee also has proposed an alternative to the current capital
adequacy regime which relies in large part upon the disciplinary and
informational qualities of uninsured subordinated debt. This is the
best regulatory alternative to the 1988 Accord. The Shadow Pro-
posal's requirements of additional legislative action, however, may
make it burdensome to implement. Perhaps the underlying problem
is that government attempts to adequately regulate bank capital are
doomed from their initiation.
Government officials have not accorded the possibility of deregu-
lation the keen attention it deserves. In treating banks differently
from other corporations by mandating capital ratios, regulators have
denied the reality that "little is known about insolvency probability.
'387
Furthermore, "economists have found no statistical correlation be-
tween bank capital levels and bank failures."m Still, regulators con-
tinue to argue that rules governing bank capital are sure to prevent
widespread financial crises. Regulators, however, have lost some
ground. Both the New Framework and the Shadow Proposal acknowl-
edge that "regulators and supervisors are not as skilled in measuring
116 SeeJoseph J. Norton, Structuring the Banking Regulators and Supervisors: Developed
Country Experiences and Their Possible Implications for Latin America and Other Developing
Countries, NAFTA: L. & BUS. REV. AM., Summer 1998, at 5, 9-12 (highlighting that in
many countries promulgation and supervision of aspects of capital adequacy rules are
split among the central bank and other agencies).
7 Mingo, supra note 34, at 52.
Darringer, supra note 192, at 259.
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risk as market participants. ' 89 The Basle Committee's eventual
authorization of internal credit risk models is an indication that regu-
lators are surrendering to market processes. Nevertheless, when
banks maintain capital on the basis of regulatory rather than market
demands, only detrimental results will follow.
First, inappropriate capital requirements will induce a misallocation
of capital resources within the banking industry, as well as between bank
and non-bank commercial sectors. Second, they will induce distortions
in bank pricing and business decisions, resulting in a misallocation of re-
sources due to balance sheet restructuring. Third, they may cause a
global credit crunch. Fourth, they may induce banks to increase portfo-
lio risk or acquire the riskiest assets within each asset classification. Last,
setting inappropriate capital requirements will drive certain business
from the regulated sector to the unregulated sector. 90
Despite a trend toward integrating regulatory and market proc-
esses, the mainstay of the next Basle Accord, whether it resembles the
New Framework or the Shadow Proposal, will still require banks to
maintain a rigid capital ratio. It is no wonder why so many bankers,
lawyers, and scholars are continually questioning the adequacy of in-
ternational capital adequacy rules.
-" Shadow Proposal, supra note 11, at 31.
SSO Darringer, supra note 192, at 330.
184920001
* * * * * *
